{"id":"CVE-2020-16630","aliases":["EUVD-2020-8591","GHSA-h5cr-94cg-hxmr"],"status":"published","title":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an...","description":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary","from":"nvd"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00689,"percentile":0.53013,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-863"],"published":"2021-09-20T19:20:50Z","modified":"2026-06-17T02:58:04Z","products":[{"vendor":"ti","product":"15.4-stack"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"ble5-stack"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"dynamic_multi-protocal_manager"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"easylink"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"openthread"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"real-time_operating_system"},{"vendor":"ti","product":"z-stack"}],"references":[{"url":"http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.html","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Vendor Advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdf","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Exploit","Third Party Advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16630"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h5cr-94cg-hxmr"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2020-16630","description":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.","status":"published","published":"2021-09-20T19:20:50Z","modified":"2024-08-04T13:45:33.225Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:35:59.116379Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2020-8591","description":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.","status":"published","published":"2021-09-20T19:20:50Z","modified":"2024-08-04T13:45:33Z","updated_at":"2026-11-03T03:07:28.222143Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-h5cr-94cg-hxmr","title":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an...","description":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.","status":"published","published":"2022-05-24T22:28:41Z","modified":"2023-01-30T05:05:35Z","cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:47:18.801591Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2020-16630","description":"TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.","status":"published","published":"2021-09-20T20:15:11.337Z","modified":"2026-06-17T02:58:04.477Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"},{"version":"2.0","score":4.3,"vector":"AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:06:45.704484Z"}]}}