{"id":"CVE-2022-1053","aliases":["EUVD-2022-0134","GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5","PYSEC-2022-184","SUSE-SU-2022:2658-1","openSUSE-SU-2024:12104-1"],"status":"published","title":"Tenant and Verifier might not use the same registrar data","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"primary","from":"nvd"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.01479,"percentile":0.74232,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-20"],"published":"2022-05-05T15:59:35Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"keylime","fixed_in":["6.4.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"keylime","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.4.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"keylime","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.4.0"}]}],"versions":["6.3.1","6.3.2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"keylime","ranges":[{"type":"GIT","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"bd5de712acdd77860e7dc58969181e16c7a8dc5d"}]},{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.4.0"}]}],"versions":["6.3.1","6.3.2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Module for Basesystem 15 SP4","package":"keylime","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.3.2-150400.4.11.1"}]}],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Leap 15.4","package":"keylime","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.3.2-150400.4.11.1"}]}],"bundled":2}],"products":[{"vendor":"fedoraproject","product":"fedora"},{"vendor":"keylime","product":"keylime"},{"vendor":"keylime project","product":"keylime"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/keylime/keylime/commit/bd5de712acdd77860e7dc58969181e16c7a8dc5d","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","Third Party Advisory","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2065024%2C","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/keylime/keylime/security/advisories/GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5%2C","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","advisory"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A7WAKVXM7L5D2DUACV6EHA6EJNAX2GVL/","tags":["vendor-advisory","x_refsource_FEDORA","x_transferred","advisory"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WEW2PAXO5YGLDLPG45YV2OPLJXJSCECQ/","tags":["vendor-advisory","x_refsource_FEDORA","x_transferred","advisory"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RF6QHU4UGSBATC3HOOE7OP66CYVTR7CV/","tags":["vendor-advisory","x_refsource_FEDORA","x_transferred","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/keylime/keylime/security/advisories/GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1053","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/keylime/PYSEC-2022-184.yaml","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2065024","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A7WAKVXM7L5D2DUACV6EHA6EJNAX2GVL","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RF6QHU4UGSBATC3HOOE7OP66CYVTR7CV","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WEW2PAXO5YGLDLPG45YV2OPLJXJSCECQ","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2022/1xxx/CVE-2022-1053.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/keylime/keylime","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2065024,","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/keylime/keylime/security/advisories/GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5,","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A7WAKVXM7L5D2DUACV6EHA6EJNAX2GVL/","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WEW2PAXO5YGLDLPG45YV2OPLJXJSCECQ/","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RF6QHU4UGSBATC3HOOE7OP66CYVTR7CV/","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2022/suse-su-20222658-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1199253","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1200885","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1201466","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1201866","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-1053","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-31250","tags":["web"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2022-1053","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","status":"published","published":"2022-05-06T16:45:03Z","modified":"2024-08-02T23:47:43.276Z","cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:34:38.263045Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2022-0134","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","status":"published","published":"2022-05-06T16:45:03Z","modified":"2024-08-02T23:47:43Z","updated_at":"2026-11-03T03:26:03.022972Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5","title":"Tenant and Verifier might not use the same registrar data","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1. At this time, there are no known workaround.","status":"published","published":"2022-05-05T15:59:35Z","modified":"2026-03-30T19:47:12Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:46.119458Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2022-1053","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","status":"published","published":"2022-05-06T17:15:08.77Z","modified":"2026-06-17T04:21:44.343Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"},{"version":"2.0","score":6.4,"vector":"AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:07:19.51203Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-jf66-3q76-h5p5","title":"Tenant and Verifier might not use the same registrar data","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1. At this time, there are no known workaround.","status":"published","published":"2022-05-05T15:59:35Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:49:34.156499888Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:50.336262Z"},{"id":"CVE-2022-1053","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","status":"published","published":"2022-05-06T16:45:03Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07.736463171Z","cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:23.245966Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2024:12104-1","title":"keylime-agent-6.4.0-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the keylime-agent-6.4.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2024-06-15T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-02-04T03:35:17.60527Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:35.485255Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2022-184","description":"Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust because a not validated AK is used by the verifier. This issue is worse if the validation happens first and then the agent gets added to the verifier because the timing is easier and the verifier does not validate the regcount entry being equal to 1,","status":"published","published":"2022-05-06T17:15:00Z","modified":"2026-05-05T15:26:03.587915176Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:53.449407Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2022:2658-1","title":"Security update for keylime","description":"This update for keylime fixes the following issues:\n\nUpdate to version 6.3.2, including fixes for:\n\n- CVE-2022-1053: Fixed Tenant and Verifier might not use the same registrar data (bsc#1199253).\n- CVE-2022-31250: Fixed %post scriplet allows for privilege escalation from keylime user to root (bsc#1200885).\n","status":"published","published":"2022-08-03T19:05:06Z","modified":"2026-02-04T03:39:28.651248Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:50.965375Z"}]}}