{"id":"CVE-2023-25187","aliases":["EUVD-2023-29151","GHSA-cmvf-q3f2-554c"],"status":"published","title":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN...","description":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AC:H/AV:L/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:H/S:U/UI:R","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00956,"percentile":0.6171,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-798"],"published":"2023-06-16T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-06-17T05:40:52Z","exploits":[{"source":"exploitdb","id":"EDB-51535","title":"Nokia ASIKA 7.13.52 - Hard-coded private key disclosure","type":"remote","platform":"hardware","date":"2023-06-20","url":"https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51535"}],"products":[{"vendor":"nokia","product":"asika_airscale_firmware"}],"references":[{"url":"https://Nokia.com","tags":["x_transferred","Product"]},{"url":"https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/","tags":["x_transferred","Vendor Advisory"]},{"url":"http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.html","tags":["x_transferred","Exploit","Third Party Advisory","VDB Entry"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25187"},{"url":"https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmvf-q3f2-554c"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2023-25187","description":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.","status":"published","published":"2023-06-16T00:00:00Z","modified":"2024-12-12T20:38:02.588Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AC:H/AV:L/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:H/S:U/UI:R","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:35:19.959682Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2023-29151","description":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.","status":"published","published":"2023-06-16T00:00:00Z","modified":"2024-12-12T20:38:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AC:H/AV:L/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:H/S:U/UI:R","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:04:36.024922Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-cmvf-q3f2-554c","title":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN...","description":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.","status":"published","published":"2023-06-16T21:30:26Z","modified":"2024-04-04T04:55:21Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:56:28.408484Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2023-25187","description":"An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.","status":"published","published":"2023-06-16T20:15:09.297Z","modified":"2026-06-17T05:40:52.62Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:08:06.335469Z"}]}}