{"id":"CVE-2024-31463","aliases":["EUVD-2024-29345","GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r"],"status":"published","title":"Ironic-image allows unauthenticated local access to Ironic API","description":"Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00206,"percentile":0.10683,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-288"],"published":"2024-04-17T15:21:49Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"metal3-io","product":"ironic-image"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","x_transferred","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","x_transferred","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/31xxx/CVE-2024-31463.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31463","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2024-31463","title":"Ironic-image allows unauthenticated local access to Ironic API","description":"Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. ","status":"published","published":"2024-04-17T15:21:49.384Z","modified":"2024-08-02T01:52:57.081Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-288"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:34:14.649724Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2024-29345","description":"Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. ","status":"published","published":"2024-04-17T15:21:49Z","modified":"2024-08-02T01:52:57Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T03:50:24.06764Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2024-31463","description":"Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. ","status":"published","published":"2024-04-17T16:15:08.637Z","modified":"2026-06-17T07:28:28.497Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-288"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:09:52.184911Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2024-31463","title":"Ironic-image allows unauthenticated local access to Ironic API","description":"Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. ","status":"published","published":"2024-04-17T15:21:49.384Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:00.728056818Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-288"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:40.06138Z"}]}}