{"id":"CVE-2025-34500","aliases":["EUVD-2025-35895","GHSA-rhx6-vj26-2frq"],"status":"published","title":"Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 Insecure Update Chain","description":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0015,"percentile":0.04256,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-321","CWE-327","CWE-347"],"published":"2025-10-24T23:02:29Z","modified":"2026-10-08T11:10:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"light \u0026 wonder, inc. / shfl entertainment, inc. / shuffle master, inc.","product":"deck mate 2"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf","tags":["technical-description","exploit"]},{"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/","tags":["media-coverage"]},{"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/","tags":["media-coverage"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain","tags":["third-party-advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34500"},{"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack"},{"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rhx6-vj26-2frq"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-34500","title":"Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 Insecure Update Chain","description":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.","status":"published","published":"2025-10-24T23:02:29.851Z","modified":"2026-07-28T01:48:05.051Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-321","CWE-327","CWE-347"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:54.1527Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2025-35895","description":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.","status":"published","published":"2025-10-24T23:02:29Z","modified":"2026-07-28T01:48:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:32.608142Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rhx6-vj26-2frq","title":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature...","description":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.","status":"published","published":"2025-10-25T00:30:39Z","modified":"2025-10-25T00:30:45Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:04:13.243027Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-34500","description":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.","status":"published","published":"2025-10-24T23:15:46.62Z","modified":"2026-10-08T11:10:00.25Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-321","CWE-327","CWE-347"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:39.579859Z"}]}}