{"id":"CVE-2025-59340","aliases":["EUVD-2025-29780","GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v"],"status":"published","title":"jinjava Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization","description":"jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.02185,"percentile":0.82543,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"published":"2025-09-17T19:56:21Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava","fixed_in":["2.8.1","2.7.5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.8.0"},{"last_affected":"2.8.0"},{"fixed":"2.8.1"}]}],"versions":["2.8.0"]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.7.0"},{"fixed":"2.7.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.8.0"},{"fixed":"2.8.1"}]}],"versions":["2.8.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.7.0"},{"fixed":"2.7.5"}]}],"versions":["2.7.0","2.7.1","2.7.2","2.7.3","2.7.4"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"hubspot","product":"jinjava"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/security/advisories/GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/66df351e7e8ad71ca04dcacb4b65782af820b8b1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.8.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59340","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.7.5","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/8141","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/59xxx/CVE-2025-59340.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-59340","title":"jinjava Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization","description":"jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T20:01:55.788Z","modified":"2025-09-18T15:45:23.121Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:47.447481Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2025-29780","description":"jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T20:01:55Z","modified":"2025-09-18T15:45:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T20:31:41.781446Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v","title":"jinjava has Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization","description":"### Summary\n\njinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed.\n\nBy using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE).\n\n### Details\n\njinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance.\nThis variable was previously abused and protections were added to prevent call method from `JinjavaInterpreter` instances (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/1b9aaa4b420c58b4a301cf4b7d26207f1c8d1165)).\nHowever, interacting with the properties of `JinjavaInterpreter` instances remains [unrestricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L80-L84).\n\nFrom `____int3rpr3t3r____`, it is possible to traverse to the `config` field, which exposes an ObjectMapper. By invoking `readValue(String content, JavaType valueType)` on this ObjectMapper, an attacker can instantiate arbitrary classes specified via `JavaType`.\n\nAlthough jinjava explicitly restricts dangerous classes such as `Class`, `ClassLoader`, and so on inside `JinjavaBeanELResolver`, the `JavaType` class itself is [not restricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L246-L262). \n\nAs a result, an attacker can leverage `JavaType` construction (`constructFromCanonical`) to instantiate semi-arbitrary classes without directly calling restricted methods.\n\nThis allows sandbox escape and the creation of powerful primitives. \n\n### Impact\nEscape the Jinjava sandbox and instantiate a wide range of classes using JavaType.\nThis capability can be used to read arbitrary files and to perform full read SSRF by creating network-related objects.\nIn certain environments, depending on the available classes, this primitive can even lead to complete remote code execution.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T19:56:21Z","modified":"2026-07-31T22:15:58Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:55.903445Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-59340","description":"jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T20:15:36.43Z","modified":"2026-06-17T09:45:56.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:29.650057Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2025-59340","title":"jinjava Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization","description":"jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T20:01:55.788Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01.008272697Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:51.190588Z"},{"id":"GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v","title":"jinjava has Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization","description":"### Summary\n\njinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed.\n\nBy using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE).\n\n### Details\n\njinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance.\nThis variable was previously abused and protections were added to prevent call method from `JinjavaInterpreter` instances (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/1b9aaa4b420c58b4a301cf4b7d26207f1c8d1165)).\nHowever, interacting with the properties of `JinjavaInterpreter` instances remains [unrestricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L80-L84).\n\nFrom `____int3rpr3t3r____`, it is possible to traverse to the `config` field, which exposes an ObjectMapper. By invoking `readValue(String content, JavaType valueType)` on this ObjectMapper, an attacker can instantiate arbitrary classes specified via `JavaType`.\n\nAlthough jinjava explicitly restricts dangerous classes such as `Class`, `ClassLoader`, and so on inside `JinjavaBeanELResolver`, the `JavaType` class itself is [not restricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L246-L262). \n\nAs a result, an attacker can leverage `JavaType` construction (`constructFromCanonical`) to instantiate semi-arbitrary classes without directly calling restricted methods.\n\nThis allows sandbox escape and the creation of powerful primitives. \n\n### Impact\nEscape the Jinjava sandbox and instantiate a wide range of classes using JavaType.\nThis capability can be used to read arbitrary files and to perform full read SSRF by creating network-related objects.\nIn certain environments, depending on the available classes, this primitive can even lead to complete remote code execution.","status":"published","published":"2025-09-17T19:56:21Z","modified":"2026-07-31T22:30:23.044427296Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:51.463834Z"}]}}