{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","aliases":["EUVD-2025-209860","GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"],"status":"published","title":"Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00492,"percentile":0.42801,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-307"],"published":"2026-05-13T20:02:15Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@strapi/plugin-users-permissions","fixed_in":["5.45.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@strapi/plugin-users-permissions","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"5.44.0"},{"fixed":"5.45.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@strapi/plugin-users-permissions","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"5.45.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"strapi","product":"@strapi/plugin-users-permissions"},{"vendor":"strapi","product":"strapi"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","Product","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64526","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/64xxx/CVE-2025-64526.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","title":"Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T18:32:01.998Z","modified":"2026-05-16T00:49:25.996Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:46.750177Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2025-209860","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T18:32:01Z","modified":"2026-05-16T00:49:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:04:27.676923Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw","title":"Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying","description":"### Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details\n\n- CVE: CVE-2025-64526\n- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` (6.9 — Medium)\n- Affected Versions: `@strapi/plugin-users-permissions` \u003c=5.44.0\n- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to \u003e=5.45.0\n\n### Description of CVE-2025-64526\n\nIn Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.\n\nThe rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request.\n\nThe patch maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.\n\n### IoC's for CVE-2025-64526\n\nIndicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:\n\n- Unusually high volumes of `POST` requests to `/api/auth/local`, `/api/auth/reset-password`, or `/api/auth/change-password` from a single IP within a 5-minute window without 429 (Too Many Requests) responses\n- Request bodies on `/api/auth/local` containing both `identifier` AND `email` fields where `email` varies per request. Body shape regex: `\"identifier\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\",\\s*\"email\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\"`\n- Request bodies on `/api/auth/reset-password` containing an unexpected `email` field alongside `code`. Body shape regex: `\"code\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\",.*\"email\"\\s*:`\n- Server logs showing many distinct rate-limit key prefixes for the same IP+route combination within the rate-limit window\n- Successful authentication or password reset following hundreds of preceding 401/400 responses from the same IP","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T20:02:15Z","modified":"2026-05-15T23:44:21Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:10.269075Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T19:16:29.233Z","modified":"2026-10-14T13:10:00.187Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:02.090779Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","title":"Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T18:32:01.998Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01.279338811Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:51.851511Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw","title":"Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying","description":"### Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details\n\n- CVE: CVE-2025-64526\n- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` (6.9 — Medium)\n- Affected Versions: `@strapi/plugin-users-permissions` \u003c=5.44.0\n- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to \u003e=5.45.0\n\n### Description of CVE-2025-64526\n\nIn Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.\n\nThe rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request.\n\nThe patch maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.\n\n### IoC's for CVE-2025-64526\n\nIndicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:\n\n- Unusually high volumes of `POST` requests to `/api/auth/local`, `/api/auth/reset-password`, or `/api/auth/change-password` from a single IP within a 5-minute window without 429 (Too Many Requests) responses\n- Request bodies on `/api/auth/local` containing both `identifier` AND `email` fields where `email` varies per request. Body shape regex: `\"identifier\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\",\\s*\"email\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\"`\n- Request bodies on `/api/auth/reset-password` containing an unexpected `email` field alongside `code`. Body shape regex: `\"code\"\\s*:\\s*\"[^\"]*\",.*\"email\"\\s*:`\n- Server logs showing many distinct rate-limit key prefixes for the same IP+route combination within the rate-limit window\n- Successful authentication or password reset following hundreds of preceding 401/400 responses from the same IP","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T20:02:15Z","modified":"2026-05-16T00:05:28.260538Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.349637Z"}]}}