{"id":"CVE-2025-68949","aliases":["EUVD-2026-2029","GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp"],"status":"published","title":"n8n has a Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching","description":"n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.003,"percentile":0.22962,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-183","CWE-284"],"published":"2026-01-13T14:57:12Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:50Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"n8n","fixed_in":["2.2.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"n8n","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.36.0"},{"fixed":"2.2.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"n8n","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.36.0"},{"fixed":"2.2.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"n8n","product":"n8n"},{"vendor":"n8n-io","product":"n8n"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/issues/23399","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","report","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/pull/23399","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/11f8597d4ad69ea3b58941573997fdbc4de1fec5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68949","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/68xxx/CVE-2025-68949.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-68949","title":"n8n has a Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching","description":"n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T18:43:20.189Z","modified":"2026-01-13T19:00:47.909Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:35.742256Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-2029","description":"n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T18:43:20Z","modified":"2026-01-13T19:00:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:52.739812Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp","title":"n8n: Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching","description":"## Impact\nThe Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring.\n\nThis issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary.\n\n## Patches\nThis issue has been patched in version 2.2.0.\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to v2.2.0 or later, where IP whitelist validation uses strict IP comparison logic rather than partial string matching.\n\n## Workarounds\nUsers unable to upgrade immediately should avoid relying solely on IP whitelisting for webhook security. Recommended mitigations include:\n- Adding authentication mechanisms such as shared secrets, HMAC signatures, or API keys.\n- Avoiding short or prefix-based whitelist entries.\n- Enforcing IP filtering at the network layer (for example, via reverse proxies or firewalls).","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T14:57:12Z","modified":"2026-01-13T21:40:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-183","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:17.333958Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-68949","description":"n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T19:16:15.637Z","modified":"2026-06-17T09:59:52.797Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:56.616231Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2025-68949","title":"n8n has a Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching","description":"n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From 1.36.0 to before 2.2.0, the Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring. This issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T18:43:20.189Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:50.448037053Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:52.859856Z"},{"id":"GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp","title":"n8n: Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching","description":"## Impact\nThe Webhook node’s IP whitelist validation performed partial string matching instead of exact IP comparison. As a result, an incoming request could be accepted if the source IP address merely contained the configured whitelist entry as a substring.\n\nThis issue affected instances where workflow editors relied on IP-based access controls to restrict webhook access. Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were impacted. An attacker with a non-whitelisted IP could bypass restrictions if their IP shared a partial prefix with a trusted address, undermining the intended security boundary.\n\n## Patches\nThis issue has been patched in version 2.2.0.\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to v2.2.0 or later, where IP whitelist validation uses strict IP comparison logic rather than partial string matching.\n\n## Workarounds\nUsers unable to upgrade immediately should avoid relying solely on IP whitelisting for webhook security. Recommended mitigations include:\n- Adding authentication mechanisms such as shared secrets, HMAC signatures, or API keys.\n- Avoiding short or prefix-based whitelist entries.\n- Enforcing IP filtering at the network layer (for example, via reverse proxies or firewalls).","status":"published","published":"2026-01-13T14:57:12Z","modified":"2026-02-03T02:59:51.944343Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-134","CWE-183","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:58.401149Z"}]}}