{"id":"CVE-2025-69206","aliases":["EUVD-2025-205597","GHSA-vvxf-wj5w-6gj5"],"status":"published","title":"Hemmelig has SSRF Filter bypass in Secret Request functionality","description":"Hemmelig is a messing app with with client-side encryption and self-destructing messages. Prior to version 7.3.3, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding or open redirect services. This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. Version 7.3.3 contains a patch for the issue.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00203,"percentile":0.10284,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2025-12-29T15:55:12Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:49Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"hemmelig","fixed_in":["7.3.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"hemmelig","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.3.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"hemmelig","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.3.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"hemmelig","product":"hemmelig"},{"vendor":"hemmeligorg","product":"hemmelig.app"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/HemmeligOrg/Hemmelig.app/security/advisories/GHSA-vvxf-wj5w-6gj5","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HemmeligOrg/Hemmelig.app/commit/6c909e571d0797ee3bbd2c72e4eb767b57378228","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69206","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vvxf-wj5w-6gj5"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/69xxx/CVE-2025-69206.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/HemmeligOrg/Hemmelig.app","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69206","title":"Hemmelig has SSRF Filter bypass in Secret Request functionality","description":"Hemmelig is a messing app with with client-side encryption and self-destructing messages. Prior to version 7.3.3, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding or open redirect services. This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. Version 7.3.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T15:55:12.761Z","modified":"2025-12-29T16:50:43.152Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:41.089134Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2025-205597","description":"Hemmelig is a messing app with with client-side encryption and self-destructing messages. Prior to version 7.3.3, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding or open redirect services. This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. Version 7.3.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T15:55:12Z","modified":"2025-12-29T16:50:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:49:00.449163Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-vvxf-wj5w-6gj5","title":"hemmelig allows SSRF Filter bypass via Secret Request functionality","description":"### Summary\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding (e.g., `localtest.me` which resolves to `127.0.0.1`) or open redirect services (e.g., `httpbin.org/redirect-to`). This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in the `isPublicUrl` function located in `/api/lib/utils.ts`. The function validates webhook URLs against a blocklist of private IP patterns:\n\n```typescript\nexport const isPublicUrl = (url: string): boolean =\u003e {\n    const parsed = new URL(url);\n    const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    \n    const blockedPatterns = [\n        /^localhost$/,\n        /^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/,\n        /^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/,\n        // ... other patterns\n    ];\n    \n    return !blockedPatterns.some((pattern) =\u003e pattern.test(hostname));\n};\n```\n\n**The validation is flawed because:**\n\n1. **DNS Rebinding Bypass**: It only checks the hostname string, not the resolved IP address. Domains like `localtest.me` pass validation (not matching any blocked pattern) but resolve to `127.0.0.1`.\n\n2. **Open Redirect Bypass**: External URLs like `httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1` pass validation since `httpbin.org` is a public domain. When the server follows the redirect, it connects to the internal address.\n\n### PoC\nOptional: On the container that runs Hemmelig application, host a temporary port with the following command: \n```\nnode -e \"require('http').createServer((req,res)=\u003e{console.log(req.method,req.url,req.headers);res.end('ok')}).listen(8080,()=\u003econsole.log('Listening on 8080'))\"\n```\n1. Log in as an user\n2. Switch to `Secret Requests` tab and create a new request\n3. When inside the request dialog, there are 2 possible payloads that can be used on the `Webhook URL` input to bypass SSRF\n```\n1. Using domain redirect: http://localtest.me:PORT\n2. Using httpbin to perform a redirect: httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1:PORT\n```\n4. Open a new browser/tab and confirm the request by creating a secret. Upon clicking save, the port we hosted we receive a request. \n\u003cimg width=\"795\" height=\"310\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/95d559e5-ead2-4b5d-8e53-9ddec3416953\" /\u003e\n\nOtherwise, if the port doesn't exist, a similar error in the logs can be found:\n```\nSecret request webhook delivery failed after retries: TypeError: fetch failed\n    at node:internal/deps/undici/undici:15845:13\n    at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5)\n    at async sendSecretRequestWebhook (/app/api/routes/secret-requests.ts:58:34) {\n  [cause]: Error: connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:80\n      at TCPConnectWrap.afterConnect [as oncomplete] (node:net:1637:16) {\n    errno: -111,\n    code: 'ECONNREFUSED',\n    syscall: 'connect',\n    address: '127.0.0.1',\n    port: 80\n  }\n}\n```\n### Impact\nWhile the SSRF filter can be bypassed, the practical impact is limited because this is a Blind SSRF, there is no response reflected. But with certain technique like response-timing, the attackers can still indicate whether or not a port is opened.\n\n### Remediation\nReplace hostname-based validation with IP resolution checking:\n```typescript\nimport { isIP } from 'is-ip';\nimport dns from 'dns/promises';\n\nexport const isPublicUrl = async (url: string): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e =\u003e {\n    const parsed = new URL(url);\n    const hostname = parsed.hostname;\n    \n    // Resolve hostname to IP\n    let addresses: string[];\n    try {\n        if (isIP(hostname)) {\n            addresses = [hostname];\n        } else {\n            addresses = await dns.resolve4(hostname).catch(() =\u003e []);\n            const ipv6 = await dns.resolve6(hostname).catch(() =\u003e []);\n            addresses = [...addresses, ...ipv6];\n        }\n    } catch {\n        return false;\n    }\n    \n    // Check resolved IPs against blocklist\n    const privateRanges = [\n        /^127\\./,\n        /^10\\./,\n        /^192\\.168\\./,\n        /^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[0-1])\\./,\n        /^169\\.254\\./,\n        /^::1$/,\n        /^fe80:/i,\n        /^fc00:/i,\n        /^fd/i,\n    ];\n    \n    return addresses.length \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 !addresses.some(ip =\u003e \n        privateRanges.some(pattern =\u003e pattern.test(ip))\n    );\n};\n```\nAdditionally, disable following redirects in the webhook fetch call or re-validate the URL after each redirect.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T21:31:04Z","modified":"2025-12-29T21:31:06Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:15.106458Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69206","description":"Hemmelig is a messing app with with client-side encryption and self-destructing messages. Prior to version 7.3.3, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding or open redirect services. This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. Version 7.3.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T16:15:44.09Z","modified":"2026-10-07T12:10:00.17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:53.683969Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69206","title":"Hemmelig has SSRF Filter bypass in Secret Request functionality","description":"Hemmelig is a messing app with with client-side encryption and self-destructing messages. Prior to version 7.3.3, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding or open redirect services. This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. Version 7.3.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T15:55:12.761Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:49.04359072Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:52.859856Z"},{"id":"GHSA-vvxf-wj5w-6gj5","title":"hemmelig allows SSRF Filter bypass via Secret Request functionality","description":"### Summary\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding (e.g., `localtest.me` which resolves to `127.0.0.1`) or open redirect services (e.g., `httpbin.org/redirect-to`). This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in the `isPublicUrl` function located in `/api/lib/utils.ts`. The function validates webhook URLs against a blocklist of private IP patterns:\n\n```typescript\nexport const isPublicUrl = (url: string): boolean =\u003e {\n    const parsed = new URL(url);\n    const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    \n    const blockedPatterns = [\n        /^localhost$/,\n        /^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/,\n        /^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/,\n        // ... other patterns\n    ];\n    \n    return !blockedPatterns.some((pattern) =\u003e pattern.test(hostname));\n};\n```\n\n**The validation is flawed because:**\n\n1. **DNS Rebinding Bypass**: It only checks the hostname string, not the resolved IP address. Domains like `localtest.me` pass validation (not matching any blocked pattern) but resolve to `127.0.0.1`.\n\n2. **Open Redirect Bypass**: External URLs like `httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1` pass validation since `httpbin.org` is a public domain. When the server follows the redirect, it connects to the internal address.\n\n### PoC\nOptional: On the container that runs Hemmelig application, host a temporary port with the following command: \n```\nnode -e \"require('http').createServer((req,res)=\u003e{console.log(req.method,req.url,req.headers);res.end('ok')}).listen(8080,()=\u003econsole.log('Listening on 8080'))\"\n```\n1. Log in as an user\n2. Switch to `Secret Requests` tab and create a new request\n3. When inside the request dialog, there are 2 possible payloads that can be used on the `Webhook URL` input to bypass SSRF\n```\n1. Using domain redirect: http://localtest.me:PORT\n2. Using httpbin to perform a redirect: httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1:PORT\n```\n4. Open a new browser/tab and confirm the request by creating a secret. Upon clicking save, the port we hosted we receive a request. \n\u003cimg width=\"795\" height=\"310\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/95d559e5-ead2-4b5d-8e53-9ddec3416953\" /\u003e\n\nOtherwise, if the port doesn't exist, a similar error in the logs can be found:\n```\nSecret request webhook delivery failed after retries: TypeError: fetch failed\n    at node:internal/deps/undici/undici:15845:13\n    at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5)\n    at async sendSecretRequestWebhook (/app/api/routes/secret-requests.ts:58:34) {\n  [cause]: Error: connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:80\n      at TCPConnectWrap.afterConnect [as oncomplete] (node:net:1637:16) {\n    errno: -111,\n    code: 'ECONNREFUSED',\n    syscall: 'connect',\n    address: '127.0.0.1',\n    port: 80\n  }\n}\n```\n### Impact\nWhile the SSRF filter can be bypassed, the practical impact is limited because this is a Blind SSRF, there is no response reflected. But with certain technique like response-timing, the attackers can still indicate whether or not a port is opened.\n\n### Remediation\nReplace hostname-based validation with IP resolution checking:\n```typescript\nimport { isIP } from 'is-ip';\nimport dns from 'dns/promises';\n\nexport const isPublicUrl = async (url: string): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e =\u003e {\n    const parsed = new URL(url);\n    const hostname = parsed.hostname;\n    \n    // Resolve hostname to IP\n    let addresses: string[];\n    try {\n        if (isIP(hostname)) {\n            addresses = [hostname];\n        } else {\n            addresses = await dns.resolve4(hostname).catch(() =\u003e []);\n            const ipv6 = await dns.resolve6(hostname).catch(() =\u003e []);\n            addresses = [...addresses, ...ipv6];\n        }\n    } catch {\n        return false;\n    }\n    \n    // Check resolved IPs against blocklist\n    const privateRanges = [\n        /^127\\./,\n        /^10\\./,\n        /^192\\.168\\./,\n        /^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[0-1])\\./,\n        /^169\\.254\\./,\n        /^::1$/,\n        /^fe80:/i,\n        /^fc00:/i,\n        /^fd/i,\n    ];\n    \n    return addresses.length \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 !addresses.some(ip =\u003e \n        privateRanges.some(pattern =\u003e pattern.test(ip))\n    );\n};\n```\nAdditionally, disable following redirects in the webhook fetch call or re-validate the URL after each redirect.","status":"published","published":"2025-12-29T21:31:04Z","modified":"2025-12-29T21:35:47.72931Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:57.694388Z"}]}}