{"id":"CVE-2025-69263","aliases":["ALPINE-CVE-2025-69263","EUVD-2026-1190","GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw"],"status":"published","title":"pnpm Lockfile Integrity Bypass Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00475,"percentile":0.41328,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-494"],"published":"2026-01-07T19:06:59Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:33:01Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","fixed_in":["10.26.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.23","package":"pnpm","fixed_in":["10.33.4-r0"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"10.26.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.23","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"10.33.4-r0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"10.26.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pnpm","product":"pnpm"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat jboss enterprise application platform 8"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat jboss enterprise application platform expansion pack"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-69263","tags":["vdb-entry","x_refsource_REDHAT","advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2427703","tags":["issue-tracking","x_refsource_REDHAT","report"]},{"url":"https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-69263.json","tags":["x_sadp-csaf-vex","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw"},{"url":"https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2025-69263","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/69xxx/CVE-2025-69263.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69263","title":"pnpm Lockfile Integrity Bypass Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T21:31:07.567Z","modified":"2026-09-14T12:04:25.725Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-494","CWE-494"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:32:41.089134Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-1190","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T21:31:07Z","modified":"2026-09-14T12:04:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:21.2136Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","title":"pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"### Summary\n\nHTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:\n\n`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:\n```javascript\nreturn {\n  resolution: {\n    tarball: resolvedUrl,\n    // No integrity field\n  },\n  resolvedVia: 'url',\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:\n```yaml\nremote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:\n  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}\n  version: 1.0.0\n```\n\nSince there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. \n\nThis affects:\n- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`\"pkg\": \"https://example.com/pkg.tgz\"`)\n- Git shorthand dependencies (`\"pkg\": \"github:user/repo\"`)\n- Git URLs (`\"pkg\": \"git+https://github.com/user/repo\"`)\n\nnpm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.\n\n### PoC\n\nSee attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)\n\nThe POC includes:\n- A server that returns different tarball content on each request\n- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball\n- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`\n\nTo run:\n```bash\ncd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc\n./run-poc.sh\n```\n\nThe output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:\n\n- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)\n- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)\n- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time\n\nThe attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T19:06:59Z","modified":"2026-01-08T20:05:35Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-494"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:16.156387Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2025-69263","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T22:15:43.727Z","modified":"2026-10-14T16:10:00.25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-494"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:11:56.616231Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"ALPINE-CVE-2025-69263","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T22:15:43.727Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:33:01.102210721Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T07:15:53.944853Z"},{"id":"CVE-2025-69263","title":"pnpm Lockfile Integrity Bypass Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"pnpm is a package manager. Versions 10.26.2 and below store HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection. This issue is fixed in version 10.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T21:31:07.567Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:00.94746873Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-494"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:52.859856Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","title":"pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"### Summary\n\nHTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:\n\n`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:\n```javascript\nreturn {\n  resolution: {\n    tarball: resolvedUrl,\n    // No integrity field\n  },\n  resolvedVia: 'url',\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:\n```yaml\nremote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:\n  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}\n  version: 1.0.0\n```\n\nSince there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. \n\nThis affects:\n- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`\"pkg\": \"https://example.com/pkg.tgz\"`)\n- Git shorthand dependencies (`\"pkg\": \"github:user/repo\"`)\n- Git URLs (`\"pkg\": \"git+https://github.com/user/repo\"`)\n\nnpm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.\n\n### PoC\n\nSee attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)\n\nThe POC includes:\n- A server that returns different tarball content on each request\n- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball\n- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`\n\nTo run:\n```bash\ncd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc\n./run-poc.sh\n```\n\nThe output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:\n\n- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)\n- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)\n- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time\n\nThe attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.","status":"published","published":"2026-01-07T19:06:59Z","modified":"2026-02-03T03:16:20.731152Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-494"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.349637Z"}]}}