{"id":"CVE-2026-100578","aliases":["EUVD-2026-87473","GHSA-9cj9-w25j-5478","GHSA-qw7m-h363-33qw"],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw before 2026.7.1 Authorization Bypass via chat.send","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00228,"percentile":0.13656,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-09-26T02:19:04Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:51Z","products":[{"vendor":"openclaw","product":"openclaw"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qw7m-h363-33qw","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-before-2026.7.1-authorization-bypass-via-chat-send","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100578","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9cj9-w25j-5478"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/100xxx/CVE-2026-100578.json","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100578","title":"OpenClaw before 2026.7.1 Authorization Bypass via chat.send","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T02:19:04.806Z","modified":"2026-09-28T19:34:23.662Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:06.925367Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-87473","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T02:19:04Z","modified":"2026-09-28T19:34:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:52.759804Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-9cj9-w25j-5478","title":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure...","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T03:30:27Z","modified":"2026-09-26T03:30:35Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:29.177042Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100578","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T03:17:05.483Z","modified":"2026-09-28T20:17:07.223Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:51.721923Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100578","title":"OpenClaw before 2026.7.1 Authorization Bypass via chat.send","description":"OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller's ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T02:19:04.806Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:51.122911694Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:53.490346Z"}]}}