{"id":"CVE-2026-100663","aliases":["EUVD-2026-87757","GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627","GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-100663"],"status":"published","title":"Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00301,"percentile":0.23153,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-20"],"published":"2026-09-26T13:23:29Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:34Z","affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:3.2.6.Final-2","1:3.2.6.Final-2+deb8u2build0.14.04.1~esm1","1:3.2.6.Final-2+deb8u2ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:3.2.6.Final-2","1:4.0.32-1","1:4.0.33-1","1:4.0.34-1","1:4.0.34-1ubuntu0.1~esm1","1:4.0.34-1ubuntu0.1~esm2","1:4.0.34-1ubuntu0.1~esm3","1:4.0.34-1ubuntu0.1~esm4","1:4.0.34-1ubuntu0.1~esm5"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.7-4","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1~esm1","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm1","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm2","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm3","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm4","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm5","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm6","1:4.1.7-4ubuntu0.1+esm7"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.33-1","1:4.1.33-2","1:4.1.33-3","1:4.1.45-1","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm1","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm2","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm3","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm4","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm6","1:4.1.45-1ubuntu0.1~esm7"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.48-4","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u1build0.22.04.1","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2build0.22.04.1","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.1~esm1","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.1~esm2","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.1","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.1+esm1","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.1+esm3","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.2","1:4.1.48-4+deb11u2ubuntu0.2+esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.48-7","1:4.1.48-8","1:4.1.48-9","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.1~esm1","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.1~esm2","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.1","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.1+esm1","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.1+esm3","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.2","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.2+esm1","1:4.1.48-9ubuntu0.2+esm2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.48-16","1:4.1.48-16ubuntu1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS","package":"netty","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1:4.1.48-10","1:4.1.48-11","1:4.1.48-12","1:4.1.48-13","1:4.1.48-14","1:4.1.48-16","1:4.1.48-16ubuntu0.1~esm2"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"netty","product":"netty"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-http-1-connect-authority-form-mistranslated-to-malformed-http-3","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100663","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/100xxx/CVE-2026-100663.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-100663","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-100663","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100663","title":"Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:29.751Z","modified":"2026-09-28T18:48:51.788Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:06.925367Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-87757","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:29Z","modified":"2026-09-28T18:48:51Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:52.759804Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-qmrm-mg2w-2mpw","title":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not...","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T15:31:18Z","modified":"2026-09-26T15:31:22Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:30.047516Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100663","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T14:16:49.4Z","modified":"2026-09-28T19:16:45.613Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:52.081323Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100663","title":"Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:29.751Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:34.387904132Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:53.490346Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-100663","description":"Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., \"CONNECT trusted.example:443\") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to \"/\", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T14:16:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T12:58:41.842323691Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:55:58.519486Z"}]}}