{"id":"CVE-2026-100705","aliases":["BIT-kyverno-2026-100705","EUVD-2026-87678","GHSA-8x9j-8h3w-5cxq","GHSA-q825-p383-r9v5"],"status":"published","title":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00197,"percentile":0.09408,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-09-26T13:23:59Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:37Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"kyverno","fixed_in":["1.19.1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"kyverno","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.19.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"kyverno","product":"kyverno"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-q825-p383-r9v5","tags":["vendor-advisory","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kyverno-before-1.19.1-ssrf-via-legacy-apicall-service-executor","tags":["third-party-advisory","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100705","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8x9j-8h3w-5cxq"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/100xxx/CVE-2026-100705.json","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100705","title":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:59.999Z","modified":"2026-09-26T23:10:45.97Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:06.925367Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-87678","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:59Z","modified":"2026-09-26T23:10:45Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:54.286776Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8x9j-8h3w-5cxq","title":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist ...","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T15:31:22Z","modified":"2026-09-26T15:31:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:30.047516Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100705","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T14:16:55.703Z","modified":"2026-09-28T15:20:06.633Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:52.081323Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-100705","title":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-26T13:23:59.999Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:37.135566568Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:53.83521Z"},{"id":"BIT-kyverno-2026-100705","title":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor","description":"Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T09:26:25.976Z","modified":"2026-10-01T10:10:48.789375947Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:32.162822Z"}]}}