{"id":"CVE-2026-102354","aliases":["EUVD-2026-101579","GHSA-wh78-rcw2-hhg9"],"status":"published","title":"BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker","description":"BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.002,"percentile":0.09943,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-367","CWE-918"],"published":"2026-10-14T19:00:13Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:39Z","products":[{"vendor":"alam00000","product":"bentopdf"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/security/advisories/GHSA-wh78-rcw2-hhg9","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/commit/45496fcd2ed6e02dcdde0d3839cc5024c091760c","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/commit/58cd1a8893bfe06e4a59a72adc2e7db00a8b9266","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/releases/tag/v2.8.7","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102354.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102354","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102354","title":"BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker","description":"BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T19:00:13.518Z","modified":"2026-10-15T16:19:56.322Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-367","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:43.260938Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-101579","description":"BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T19:00:13Z","modified":"2026-10-15T16:19:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:00:12.42385Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102354","description":"BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T19:17:04.877Z","modified":"2026-10-15T17:17:08.797Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-367","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:59.328869Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102354","title":"BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker","description":"BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T19:00:13.518Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:39.428798106Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-367","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:53.83521Z"}]}}