{"id":"CVE-2026-102713","aliases":["EUVD-2026-89176","GHSA-fhxv-gc8j-2f6h","GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"],"status":"published","title":"Unbounded DATA datagram in the NetX Duo TFTP server causes an out-of-bounds read and a permanent stall","description":"In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00253,"percentile":0.16905,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-125","CWE-770"],"published":"2026-09-29T17:40:40Z","modified":"2026-11-04T13:03:50Z","products":[{"vendor":"eclipse foundation","product":"eclipse threadx netx duo"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102713","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fhxv-gc8j-2f6h"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102713.json","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102713","title":"Unbounded DATA datagram in the NetX Duo TFTP server causes an out-of-bounds read and a permanent stall","description":"In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z","modified":"2026-11-04T13:03:50.427Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-125","CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T14:31:12.473889Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-89176","description":"In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-29T17:40:40Z","modified":"2026-11-04T13:03:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T14:03:44.179326Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-fhxv-gc8j-2f6h","title":"The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter...","description":"The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026temp_ptr,\n\n                        server_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(\u0026(client_request_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n              packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n              packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n    #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n    #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy  filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length \u003e 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-29T18:32:00Z","modified":"2026-09-29T18:32:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:12:33.840327Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102713","description":"In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-29T18:17:10.457Z","modified":"2026-11-04T13:17:20.323Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-125","CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T16:04:09.073238Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-102713","title":"Unbounded DATA datagram in the NetX Duo TFTP server causes an out-of-bounds read and a permanent stall","description":"In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with packet chaining, the TFTP server does not bound the length of a received DATA datagram. An unauthenticated peer can upload an oversized datagram that writes memory beyond the received packet into the file and read it back by downloading the file, and the same datagram can suspend the server thread permanently.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z","modified":"2026-11-07T10:47:27.689466083Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-125","CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T11:15:38.581573Z"}]}}