{"id":"CVE-2026-104012","aliases":["EUVD-2026-114645","GHSA-8cr7-x3xr-ppw5"],"status":"published","title":"Rox Appointment Booking \u003c= 1.3.1 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment to Mass Assignment via '/public/booking' Endpoint","description":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00281,"percentile":0.20847,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-10-31T07:46:47Z","modified":"2026-11-02T16:19:19Z","products":[{"vendor":"roxnor","product":"rox appointment booking – event, calendar \u0026 appointment scheduling"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a32f428-fa6e-469b-b004-e80a1029af80?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/REST/SaveCustomer.php#L262"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/Services/CustomerService.php#L74"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php#L38"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/REST/BookingConfirm.php#L61"},{"url":"https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zip"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104012"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8cr7-x3xr-ppw5"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-104012","title":"Rox Appointment Booking \u003c= 1.3.1 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment to Mass Assignment via '/public/booking' Endpoint","description":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).","status":"published","published":"2026-10-31T07:46:47.528Z","modified":"2026-11-02T14:51:04.867Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:00:08.034842Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-114645","description":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).","status":"published","published":"2026-10-31T07:46:47Z","modified":"2026-11-02T14:51:04Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:44.835214Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8cr7-x3xr-ppw5","title":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is...","description":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).","status":"published","published":"2026-10-31T09:31:13Z","modified":"2026-10-31T09:31:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:53.83641Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-104012","description":"The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).","status":"published","published":"2026-10-31T08:16:47.893Z","modified":"2026-11-02T16:19:19.997Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T20:51:44.219211Z"}]}}