{"id":"CVE-2026-10663","aliases":["EUVD-2026-43240","GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6"],"status":"published","title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx-\u003eroot. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx-\u003eroot, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx-\u003eroot in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00236,"percentile":0.14775,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-416"],"published":"2026-07-12T16:16:48Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:39Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165","tags":["patch","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6","tags":["Patch","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/10xxx/CVE-2026-10663.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10663","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10663","title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx-\u003eroot. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx-\u003eroot, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx-\u003eroot in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-12T16:16:48.576Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:39.854Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-416"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T05:21:48.223566Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-43240","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx-\u003eroot. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx-\u003eroot, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx-\u003eroot in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-12T16:16:48Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T07:00:56.720215Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10663","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx-\u003eroot. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx-\u003eroot, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx-\u003eroot in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-12T17:16:23.12Z","modified":"2026-10-24T22:10:00.21Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-416"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:28.771746Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10663","title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx-\u003eroot. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx-\u003eroot, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx-\u003eroot in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-12T16:16:48.576Z","modified":"2026-11-05T08:04:12.629728149Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-416"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T09:08:14.330889Z"}]}}