{"id":"CVE-2026-10675","aliases":["EUVD-2026-46445","GHSA-4rwg-6mr4-55hc"],"status":"published","title":"Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV: invalidated provisioning link kept alive indefinitely, blocking (re)provisioning (DoS)","description":"In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00389,"percentile":0.33383,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-400"],"published":"2026-07-21T21:30:54Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:53Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3f3c37edf80262b838ef5402fec9880c07892e4e","tags":["patch","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4rwg-6mr4-55hc","tags":["Patch","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/10xxx/CVE-2026-10675.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10675","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10675","title":"Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV: invalidated provisioning link kept alive indefinitely, blocking (re)provisioning (DoS)","description":"In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T21:30:54.165Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:53.721Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-400"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T05:21:48.223566Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-46445","description":"In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T21:30:54Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:58:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T07:00:56.720215Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10675","description":"In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T22:16:59.8Z","modified":"2026-10-24T19:10:00.127Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-400"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:31.394335Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-10675","title":"Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV: invalidated provisioning link kept alive indefinitely, blocking (re)provisioning (DoS)","description":"In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T21:30:54.165Z","modified":"2026-11-05T08:04:07.530694623Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-400"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T09:08:14.330889Z"}]}}