{"id":"CVE-2026-107215","aliases":["EUVD-2026-94533","GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f","GO-2026-6689"],"status":"published","title":"Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: remote panic / OOM DoS","description":"Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.0024,"percentile":0.15293,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-789"],"published":"2026-10-07T17:48:03Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2","fixed_in":["2.11.1-0.20260912113515-5f636f9dcde5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.3.1"},{"fixed":"2.11.1-0.20260912113515-5f636f9dcde5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2.3.1"},{"fixed":"2.11.1-0.20260912113515-5f636f9dcde5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/360EntSecGroup-Skylar/excelize/v2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2.3.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.11.1-0.20260912113515-5f636f9dcde5"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"excelize","product":"excelize"},{"vendor":"qax-os","product":"excelize"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/pull/2396","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/5f636f9dcde55911f14290060b017f0cc88cd694","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107215","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107215.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/qax-os/excelize","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-107215","title":"Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: remote panic / OOM DoS","description":"Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-07T17:48:03.233Z","modified":"2026-10-10T02:38:31.276Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-789"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:45:14.072357Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-94533","description":"Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-07T17:48:03Z","modified":"2026-10-10T02:38:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:24.157251Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f","title":"Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: remote panic / OOM DoS","description":"### Summary\n\n`extractPart` allocates directly from the mscfb directory-entry size with no clamping (`crypt.go:198`, same missing bound at `crypt.go:204`):\n\n```go\nbuf := make([]byte, entry.Size)\n```\n\n`entry.Size` is the raw `streamSize` field from the attacker-controlled CFB directory entry (mscfb v1.0.8 `fixFile`, `file.go:109-120`: full uint64 → int64 for major version 4, low uint32 for v3). mscfb only detects short sector chains later, inside `File.Read` (`file.go:485-489` \"emergency brake\") — i.e. **after** the allocation. The zip path already enforces `UnzipSizeLimit`, and the KDF path bounds work with `maxSpinCount`; this path consults no limit at all.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo consequences, both execution-confirmed against pristine master (`ecd99d761fe0`, 2026-09-08):\n\n1. **Hard crash**: a version-4 CFB declaring `streamSize = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF` yields `entry.Size == -1` → `panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range`, which escapes `Decrypt` (`openReaderAt` converts errors, not panics, `excelize.go:210-214`) and kills the process.\n2. **Memory exhaustion**: any CFB (v3 suffices) declaring `streamSize` up to `0xFFFFFFFF` forces up to 4 GiB of zeroed allocation from a ~12 KB file — an amplification factor of ~350,000×, trivially repeated per request in memory-limited deployments.\n\nCall path: `OpenFile`/`OpenReader`/`OpenBytes` → `openReaderAt` (`excelize.go:208-215`, OLE magic sniff) → `Decrypt` (`crypt.go:145-150`) → `extractPart` (`crypt.go:198`).\n\n### PoC\n\nA standalone program (public API only) was provided to the maintainer by email (`2-extractpart-oom`): it builds a valid-enough v4 (4096-byte sector) CFB — header (signature, sector shift `0x0C`, `DIFAT[0]=1`), one directory sector with Root Entry (typeID 5, child=1) and a stream entry `EncryptionInfo` (objectType=2, startingSector=endOfChain, `streamSize=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF`). `mscfb.New` succeeds, `doc.Next()` returns the entry, and `extractPart` calls `make([]byte, -1)` before any chain validation. On master `ecd99d761fe0` the program prints `panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range`; with the proposed patch it prints BLOCKED. An `-oom` flag demonstrates the 4 GiB allocation variant with `streamSize = 0xFFFFFFFF`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker uploads any file starting with the OLE signature `D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1` (~12 KB is enough) to a service that calls `excelize.OpenFile`/`OpenReader`/`OpenBytes` on it (or calls `Decrypt` directly): remote, unauthenticated process crash (hard panic) or forced 4 GiB allocation per request (OOM) with a ~350,000× amplification factor.\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nBound the declared stream size before allocating in `extractPart`: reject negative sizes and sizes above a sane policy cap (1 GiB is far above any real encrypted-workbook part) with `ErrWorkbookFileFormat`, so malformed CFBs are rejected as errors instead of panicking or OOMing. A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer; verified that the patch blocks the PoC while legitimate `Encrypt()` output still opens.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-08T16:31:26Z","modified":"2026-10-08T16:31:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-789"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:29.107536Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-107215","description":"Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-07T18:17:19.213Z","modified":"2026-10-13T14:23:50.54Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-789"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:54.809359Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-107215","title":"Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: remote panic / OOM DoS","description":"Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-07T17:48:03.233Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35.108129783Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-789"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:54.933106Z"},{"id":"GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f","title":"Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: remote panic / OOM DoS","description":"### Summary\n\n`extractPart` allocates directly from the mscfb directory-entry size with no clamping (`crypt.go:198`, same missing bound at `crypt.go:204`):\n\n```go\nbuf := make([]byte, entry.Size)\n```\n\n`entry.Size` is the raw `streamSize` field from the attacker-controlled CFB directory entry (mscfb v1.0.8 `fixFile`, `file.go:109-120`: full uint64 → int64 for major version 4, low uint32 for v3). mscfb only detects short sector chains later, inside `File.Read` (`file.go:485-489` \"emergency brake\") — i.e. **after** the allocation. The zip path already enforces `UnzipSizeLimit`, and the KDF path bounds work with `maxSpinCount`; this path consults no limit at all.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo consequences, both execution-confirmed against pristine master (`ecd99d761fe0`, 2026-09-08):\n\n1. **Hard crash**: a version-4 CFB declaring `streamSize = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF` yields `entry.Size == -1` → `panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range`, which escapes `Decrypt` (`openReaderAt` converts errors, not panics, `excelize.go:210-214`) and kills the process.\n2. **Memory exhaustion**: any CFB (v3 suffices) declaring `streamSize` up to `0xFFFFFFFF` forces up to 4 GiB of zeroed allocation from a ~12 KB file — an amplification factor of ~350,000×, trivially repeated per request in memory-limited deployments.\n\nCall path: `OpenFile`/`OpenReader`/`OpenBytes` → `openReaderAt` (`excelize.go:208-215`, OLE magic sniff) → `Decrypt` (`crypt.go:145-150`) → `extractPart` (`crypt.go:198`).\n\n### PoC\n\nA standalone program (public API only) was provided to the maintainer by email (`2-extractpart-oom`): it builds a valid-enough v4 (4096-byte sector) CFB — header (signature, sector shift `0x0C`, `DIFAT[0]=1`), one directory sector with Root Entry (typeID 5, child=1) and a stream entry `EncryptionInfo` (objectType=2, startingSector=endOfChain, `streamSize=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF`). `mscfb.New` succeeds, `doc.Next()` returns the entry, and `extractPart` calls `make([]byte, -1)` before any chain validation. On master `ecd99d761fe0` the program prints `panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range`; with the proposed patch it prints BLOCKED. An `-oom` flag demonstrates the 4 GiB allocation variant with `streamSize = 0xFFFFFFFF`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker uploads any file starting with the OLE signature `D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1` (~12 KB is enough) to a service that calls `excelize.OpenFile`/`OpenReader`/`OpenBytes` on it (or calls `Decrypt` directly): remote, unauthenticated process crash (hard panic) or forced 4 GiB allocation per request (OOM) with a ~350,000× amplification factor.\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nBound the declared stream size before allocating in `extractPart`: reject negative sizes and sizes above a sane policy cap (1 GiB is far above any real encrypted-workbook part) with `ErrWorkbookFileFormat`, so malformed CFBs are rejected as errors instead of panicking or OOMing. A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer; verified that the patch blocks the PoC while legitimate `Encrypt()` output still opens.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-08T16:31:26Z","modified":"2026-10-19T21:41:17.838565606Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-789"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.484835Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6689","title":"Panic and memory exhaustion via unbounded CFB stream allocation in github.com/xuri/excelize","description":"Panic and memory exhaustion via unbounded CFB stream allocation in github.com/xuri/excelize","status":"published","published":"2026-10-19T21:08:21Z","modified":"2026-10-19T21:31:52.826584494Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:03.11707Z"}]}}