{"id":"CVE-2026-110018","aliases":["EUVD-2026-109265","GHSA-j3rc-5xc4-8hjg"],"status":"published","title":"aBlocks \u003c= 2.17.0 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Privilege Escalation to 'roleSlug' Block Attribute","description":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block's `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType='login'` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00387,"percentile":0.33249,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-10-24T11:30:30Z","modified":"2026-10-26T18:17:34Z","products":[{"vendor":"kodezen","product":"ablocks – gutenberg blocks, user dashboard builder, popup builder, form builder \u0026 animation builder"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6fe7efb5-540b-4d85-852f-ad572da7ecdd?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ablocks/tags/2.16.0/includes/api/form-builder-controller.php#L353"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ablocks/tags/2.16.0/includes/api/form-builder-controller.php#L70"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ablocks/tags/2.16.0/includes/api/form-builder-controller.php#L345"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ablocks/tags/2.16.0/includes/blocks/form-builder/block-attr-sanitizer/sanitizers/form-builder/registration-form-sanitizer.php#L28"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ablocks/tags/2.16.0/includes/api/form-builder-controller.php#L685"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3756864%40ablocks\u0026new=3756864%40ablocks"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110018"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j3rc-5xc4-8hjg"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-110018","title":"aBlocks \u003c= 2.17.0 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Privilege Escalation to 'roleSlug' Block Attribute","description":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block's `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType='login'` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-24T11:30:30.545Z","modified":"2026-10-26T17:40:59.505Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:34:26.24368Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-109265","description":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block's `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType='login'` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-24T11:30:30Z","modified":"2026-10-26T17:40:59Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:28.784227Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-j3rc-5xc4-8hjg","title":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation...","description":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block's `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType='login'` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-24T12:30:23Z","modified":"2026-10-24T12:30:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:21.369076Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-110018","description":"The aBlocks – Gutenberg Blocks, User Dashboard Builder, Popup Builder, Form Builder \u0026 Animation Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.17.0 via the `/ablocks/v1/form-builder/registration` REST endpoint. The vulnerability exists because the endpoint is registered with `permission_callback =\u003e __return_true` and the `register()` handler reads `roleSlug` directly from attacker-controlled block attributes in `post_content` without ever verifying that the block's `formType` is `registration` — a condition that `RegistrationFormSanitizer::verify()` imposes only at save-time, meaning a Contributor can preserve an arbitrary `roleSlug` by saving a block with `formType='login'` and then triggering the endpoint via a valid `wp_rest` nonce and post-ownership check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their WordPress role to Editor or any other non-administrator role and receive a fully authenticated session at the elevated privilege level via `WP_User::set_role()` and `wp_set_auth_cookie()`. Escalation is bounded below administrator-tier roles because `is_safe_registration_role()` rejects any role holding `manage_options`, `edit_users`, `delete_users`, `create_users`, `promote_users`, or `edit_theme_options`, meaning the highest practically reachable role on a standard WordPress installation is Editor.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-24T12:16:54.783Z","modified":"2026-10-26T18:17:34.883Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:03.126833Z"}]}}