{"id":"CVE-2026-114076","aliases":["EUVD-2026-107027","GHSA-3mx6-67xp-8wvp","GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4"],"status":"published","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 Blind SSRF via Alert Channel Webhook URL","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.0033,"percentile":0.26465,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-10-02T22:35:31Z","modified":"2026-10-30T02:31:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","fixed_in":["4.5.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.5.1"},{"fixed":"4.5.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.2"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"triggerdotdev","product":"trigger.dev"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/trigger-dev-before-4.5.2-blind-ssrf-via-alert-channel-webhook-url","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114076","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3mx6-67xp-8wvp"},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/114xxx/CVE-2026-114076.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114076","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 Blind SSRF via Alert Channel Webhook URL","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:45.853Z","modified":"2026-10-28T15:24:51.788Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:39:50.160666Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-107027","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:45Z","modified":"2026-10-28T15:24:51Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:20.750321Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3mx6-67xp-8wvp","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows...","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T03:32:21Z","modified":"2026-10-21T03:32:26Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:08.480034Z"},{"id":"GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","title":"Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook","description":"### Summary\n\nA WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -\u003e `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it.\n\n### Affected\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main).\n\n### Root cause\n- Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth).\n- Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim.\n- Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256\":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere.\n\n### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host)\nSeeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with `url=http://host.docker.internal:7766/...` (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API `POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_ssrfpoc/fail` -\u003e 200 -\u003e FAILED -\u003e alertsWorker -\u003e the server fetched the listener. Captured:\n```\nPOST /ssrf-via-webhook HTTP/1.1\nhost: host.docker.internal:7766\nx-trigger-signature-hmacsha256: \u003credacted\u003e\nuser-agent: node\n{\"type\":\"alert.deployment.failed\", ...}\n```\nThe webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically.\n\n### Severity\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N` ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect.\n\n### Suggested fix\nValidate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared `assertPublicUrl(url)` used by `createAlertChannel` + the two delivery sinks.\n\n### Dup\nDistinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer independently hardened the same webhook-URL-SSRF class in grav-plugin-api commit dfcc947 on 2026-06-26 — corroborating the class is real and fixable.)","status":"published","published":"2026-10-02T22:35:31Z","modified":"2026-10-02T22:35:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:24.739884Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114076","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T01:17:31.71Z","modified":"2026-10-28T16:17:05.2Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:02.045979Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114076","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 Blind SSRF via Alert Channel Webhook URL","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated tenants to make the webapp server send POST requests to internal hosts by setting an unvalidated webhook alert channel URL. Attackers can point the webhook at internal services or cloud metadata addresses and trigger alerts to scan internal hosts, send state-changing POSTs, or reach IMDSv1 via redirects.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:45.853Z","modified":"2026-10-30T02:31:07.213112675Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:56.310988Z"},{"id":"GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","title":"Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook","description":"### Summary\n\nA WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -\u003e `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it.\n\n### Affected\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main).\n\n### Root cause\n- Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth).\n- Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim.\n- Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256\":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere.\n\n### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host)\nSeeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with `url=http://host.docker.internal:7766/...` (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API `POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_ssrfpoc/fail` -\u003e 200 -\u003e FAILED -\u003e alertsWorker -\u003e the server fetched the listener. Captured:\n```\nPOST /ssrf-via-webhook HTTP/1.1\nhost: host.docker.internal:7766\nx-trigger-signature-hmacsha256: \u003credacted\u003e\nuser-agent: node\n{\"type\":\"alert.deployment.failed\", ...}\n```\nThe webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically.\n\n### Severity\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N` ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect.\n\n### Suggested fix\nValidate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared `assertPublicUrl(url)` used by `createAlertChannel` + the two delivery sinks.\n\n### Dup\nDistinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer independently hardened the same webhook-URL-SSRF class in grav-plugin-api commit dfcc947 on 2026-06-26 — corroborating the class is real and fixable.)","status":"published","published":"2026-10-02T22:35:31Z","modified":"2026-10-21T10:57:22.483043237Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:54.055966Z"}]}}