{"id":"CVE-2026-116617","aliases":["EUVD-2026-117327","GHSA-pjj3-fc28-8c9m"],"status":"published","title":"Motors \u003c= 1.4.128 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) File Deletion via 'stm_dealer_logo_path' Parameter","description":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00492,"percentile":0.42799,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-11-05T04:48:06Z","modified":"2026-11-05T06:34:37Z","products":[{"vendor":"stylemix","product":"motors – car dealership \u0026 classified listings plugin"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9760bf39-6ec3-416e-95f0-3b3ce3ecdf7f?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motors-car-dealership-classified-listings/tags/1.4.126/templates/user/private/become-dealer.php#L168"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motors-car-dealership-classified-listings/tags/1.4.126/includes/user-extra.php#L449"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/motors-car-dealership-classified-listings/tags/1.4.126/includes/helpers.php#L1400"},{"url":"https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/motors-car-dealership-classified-listings/"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3774781%40motors-car-dealership-classified-listings%2Ftags%2F1.4.129\u0026old=3766015%40motors-car-dealership-classified-listings%2Ftags%2F1.4.128"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116617"},{"url":"https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/motors-car-dealership-classified-listings"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pjj3-fc28-8c9m"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-116617","title":"Motors \u003c= 1.4.128 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) File Deletion via 'stm_dealer_logo_path' Parameter","description":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T04:48:06.751Z","modified":"2026-11-05T20:46:59.51Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T21:25:05.838392Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-117327","description":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T04:48:06Z","modified":"2026-11-05T20:46:59Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T22:02:10.222428Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-pjj3-fc28-8c9m","title":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to...","description":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T06:34:36Z","modified":"2026-11-05T06:34:37Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T06:56:57.728857Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-116617","description":"The Motors – Car Dealership \u0026 Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T05:18:19.24Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:18:39.777Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T23:57:23.479749Z"}]}}