{"id":"CVE-2026-118066","aliases":["EUVD-2026-119141","GHSA-rmmm-8g4j-3qgc"],"status":"published","title":"Appointment Booking Plugin \u003c= 5.7.6 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover via 'IS NOT NULL' Sentinel in 'password_reset_token' Parameter","description":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.02255,"percentile":0.83192,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-287"],"published":"2026-11-07T11:26:26Z","modified":"2026-11-08T19:17:34Z","exploits":[{"source":"nuclei","id":"CVE-2026-118066","title":"LatePoint \u003c 5.7.7 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass / Account Takeover","type":"detection template","url":"https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2026/CVE-2026-118066.yaml"}],"products":[{"vendor":"latepoint","product":"appointment booking plugin – latepoint | calendar \u0026 scheduling for wordpress"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2f7f5dc8-8cf7-493d-b012-89ff36a4dc02?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/models/model.php#L414"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/controllers/customer_cabinet_controller.php#L494"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/controllers/steps_controller.php#L178"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/helpers/customer_helper.php#L235"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/helpers/order_intent_helper.php#L184"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/helpers/params_helper.php#L14"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/latepoint.php#L1073"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3779410%40latepoint\u0026new=3779410%40latepoint"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118066"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rmmm-8g4j-3qgc"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-118066","title":"Appointment Booking Plugin \u003c= 5.7.6 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover via 'IS NOT NULL' Sentinel in 'password_reset_token' Parameter","description":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T11:26:26.913Z","modified":"2026-11-08T18:55:19.975Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T12:33:58.237937Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-119141","description":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T11:26:26Z","modified":"2026-11-08T18:55:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T15:09:43.759879Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rmmm-8g4j-3qgc","title":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for...","description":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T12:31:52Z","modified":"2026-11-07T12:32:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T12:37:15.096654Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-118066","description":"The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T12:17:43.717Z","modified":"2026-11-08T19:17:34.637Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T22:11:13.623406Z"}]}}