{"id":"CVE-2026-118265","aliases":["EUVD-2026-112397","GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg","GO-2026-6841","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118265"],"status":"published","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00139,"percentile":0.03302,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-348"],"published":"2026-10-23T20:50:25Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:48Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","fixed_in":["5.4.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0"},{"fixed":"5.4.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0"},{"fixed":"5.4.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0"},{"fixed":"5.4.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo.v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.2.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo.v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.3.5-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.2.1-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo.v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.2.0-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo.v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.3.10-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.11.1-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.12.0-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"golang-github-labstack-echo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.12.0-1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"labstack","product":"echo"},{"vendor":"wikimedia foundation","product":"echo"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaae","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec","tags":["web","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/118xxx/CVE-2026-118265.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118265","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/labstack/echo","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-118265","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-118265","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-118265","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T19:03:56.934Z","modified":"2026-10-29T20:54:10.718Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:03.827373Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-112397","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T19:03:56Z","modified":"2026-10-29T20:54:10Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:14.591479Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer","description":"## Impact\n\nIn Echo v5, `ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader` checked whether the address supplied in `X-Real-IP` belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by `c.RealIP()` with the extractor's default trust options.\n\nApplications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker's `X-Real-IP` value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.\n\n## Affected versions and patch\n\nAll v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1).\n\nThe patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid `X-Real-IP` value, restoring the v4 trust model. [Fix commit](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse `ExtractIPDirect` until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a duplicate of this advisory.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T20:50:25Z","modified":"2026-10-28T19:04:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:38.969831Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-118265","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T19:17:31.377Z","modified":"2026-11-04T23:10:00.223Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T01:45:13.243042Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-118265","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T19:03:56.934Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:48.522722786Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"},{"id":"GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer","description":"## Impact\n\nIn Echo v5, `ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader` checked whether the address supplied in `X-Real-IP` belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by `c.RealIP()` with the extractor's default trust options.\n\nApplications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker's `X-Real-IP` value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.\n\n## Affected versions and patch\n\nAll v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1).\n\nThe patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid `X-Real-IP` value, restoring the v4 trust model. [Fix commit](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse `ExtractIPDirect` until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a duplicate of this advisory.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T20:50:25Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:48.522722786Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-348"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118265","description":"Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T19:17:00Z","modified":"2026-11-05T04:42:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T13:33:25.727744Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6841","title":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer in github.com/labstack/echo","description":"Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer in github.com/labstack/echo","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T22:54:11Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:48.522722786Z","updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"}]}}