{"id":"CVE-2026-12047","aliases":["EUVD-2026-37967","GHSA-prff-6vwq-gf23","openSUSE-SU-2026:11508-1"],"status":"published","title":"pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00221,"percentile":0.1277,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-79"],"published":"2026-06-18T23:37:39Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:57Z","affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"pgadmin4","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"9.17-1.1"}]}],"bundled":21}],"products":[{"vendor":"pgadmin","product":"pgadmin_4"},{"vendor":"pgadmin.org","product":"pgadmin 4"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069","tags":["issue-tracking","Issue Tracking","Patch","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60d149864b5fdd99675754c7996637737a24fce3","tags":["patch","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12047","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-prff-6vwq-gf23"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/12xxx/CVE-2026-12047.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4","tags":["package"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12044","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12045","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12046","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12047","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12048","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12049","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12050","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-1707","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17347","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17349","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17350","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17351","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17566","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7813","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7814","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7815","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7816","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7817","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7818","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7819","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7820","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12047","title":"pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T23:37:39.657Z","modified":"2026-06-22T19:14:24.816Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":3.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-79","CWE-116"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:48.461833Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-37967","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T23:37:39Z","modified":"2026-06-22T19:14:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:33.850201Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-prff-6vwq-gf23","title":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions,...","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-19T00:31:38Z","modified":"2026-06-19T00:31:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"},{"version":"3.1","score":3.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:08:54.452189Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12047","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-19T00:16:47.04Z","modified":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":3.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-79","CWE-116"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:24.912854Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12047","title":"pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text","description":"HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T23:37:39.657Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:57.666479668Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":4.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:57.354194Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:11508-1","title":"pgadmin4-9.17-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the pgadmin4-9.17-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-08-14T10:30:29.877481488Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:39.516824Z"}]}}