{"id":"CVE-2026-120560","aliases":["EUVD-2026-118601","GHSA-6gxp-vf4q-ccgc"],"status":"published","title":"Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE \u003c= 2.1.5 - Unauthenticated File Deletion via 'wp_columns_actions' and 'table_id' Parameters","description":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00414,"percentile":0.36189,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-11-07T03:28:05Z","modified":"2026-11-07T06:31:20Z","products":[{"vendor":"realmag777","product":"active woot products tables for woocommerce. 100% free"},{"vendor":"unknown","product":"active woot products tables for woocommerce. 100% free"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4962c61-9059-4fb9-9ddf-5e6aa1d2675a?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1206"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1094"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1090"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L91"},{"url":"https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3784667/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120560"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6gxp-vf4q-ccgc"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-120560","title":"Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE \u003c= 2.1.5 - Unauthenticated File Deletion via 'wp_columns_actions' and 'table_id' Parameters","description":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T03:28:05.878Z","modified":"2026-11-08T19:05:24.794Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T04:32:31.343254Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-118601","description":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T03:28:05Z","modified":"2026-11-08T19:05:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T09:08:56.024426Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-6gxp-vf4q-ccgc","title":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to...","description":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T06:31:13Z","modified":"2026-11-07T06:31:20Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T06:35:59.993073Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-120560","description":"The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-07T04:17:13.37Z","modified":"2026-11-08T19:17:36.67Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T22:11:13.443661Z"}]}}