{"id":"CVE-2026-12232","aliases":["EUVD-2026-57066","GHSA-3557-j848-pv24"],"status":"published","title":"Out-of-bounds read via unvalidated stream_id in Intel ALH DAI get_properties","description":"The Intel ALH digital-audio-interface driver function dai_alh_get_properties() in drivers/dai/intel/alh/alh.c used a caller-supplied int stream_id with no range validation. The value indexes the fixed-size static const uint8_t alh_handshake_map[64] array and scales a FIFO register address, so an out-of-range stream_id produces an out-of-bounds read of one byte at an attacker-chosen signed offset from the array. That byte is written into prop-\u003edma_hs_id and the resulting struct dai_properties is copied back to the caller, leaking it.\n\ndai_get_properties_copy() is a Zephyr __syscall, and its verifier z_vrfy_dai_get_properties_copy() (drivers/dai/dai_handlers.c) validates only the device-object permission and the destination buffer, not stream_id. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to the ALH DAI device object can therefore call the syscall with an arbitrary stream_id, crossing the userspace/kernel sandbox boundary.\n\nThe impact is a one-byte-per-call arbitrary-offset kernel information disclosure (and leakage of a computed kernel address via fifo_address); a stream_id that resolves to an unmapped page faults in kernel context, giving a local denial of service. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE and device access, making this a local, moderate-severity issue. The fix rejects negative and too-large stream_id values up front and returns NULL, which the copy wrapper maps to -ENOENT.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00148,"percentile":0.04068,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-125"],"published":"2026-08-12T03:34:14Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:59:23Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/b470bfce689809621cc5cd8c04a4eca93795827a","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-3557-j848-pv24","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/12xxx/CVE-2026-12232.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12232","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12232","title":"Out-of-bounds read via unvalidated stream_id in Intel ALH DAI get_properties","description":"The Intel ALH digital-audio-interface driver function dai_alh_get_properties() in drivers/dai/intel/alh/alh.c used a caller-supplied int stream_id with no range validation. The value indexes the fixed-size static const uint8_t alh_handshake_map[64] array and scales a FIFO register address, so an out-of-range stream_id produces an out-of-bounds read of one byte at an attacker-chosen signed offset from the array. That byte is written into prop-\u003edma_hs_id and the resulting struct dai_properties is copied back to the caller, leaking it.\n\ndai_get_properties_copy() is a Zephyr __syscall, and its verifier z_vrfy_dai_get_properties_copy() (drivers/dai/dai_handlers.c) validates only the device-object permission and the destination buffer, not stream_id. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to the ALH DAI device object can therefore call the syscall with an arbitrary stream_id, crossing the userspace/kernel sandbox boundary.\n\nThe impact is a one-byte-per-call arbitrary-offset kernel information disclosure (and leakage of a computed kernel address via fifo_address); a stream_id that resolves to an unmapped page faults in kernel context, giving a local denial of service. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE and device access, making this a local, moderate-severity issue. The fix rejects negative and too-large stream_id values up front and returns NULL, which the copy wrapper maps to -ENOENT.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T03:34:14.145Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:59:23.715Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T05:21:48.223566Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-57066","description":"The Intel ALH digital-audio-interface driver function dai_alh_get_properties() in drivers/dai/intel/alh/alh.c used a caller-supplied int stream_id with no range validation. The value indexes the fixed-size static const uint8_t alh_handshake_map[64] array and scales a FIFO register address, so an out-of-range stream_id produces an out-of-bounds read of one byte at an attacker-chosen signed offset from the array. That byte is written into prop-\u003edma_hs_id and the resulting struct dai_properties is copied back to the caller, leaking it.\n\ndai_get_properties_copy() is a Zephyr __syscall, and its verifier z_vrfy_dai_get_properties_copy() (drivers/dai/dai_handlers.c) validates only the device-object permission and the destination buffer, not stream_id. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to the ALH DAI device object can therefore call the syscall with an arbitrary stream_id, crossing the userspace/kernel sandbox boundary.\n\nThe impact is a one-byte-per-call arbitrary-offset kernel information disclosure (and leakage of a computed kernel address via fifo_address); a stream_id that resolves to an unmapped page faults in kernel context, giving a local denial of service. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE and device access, making this a local, moderate-severity issue. The fix rejects negative and too-large stream_id values up front and returns NULL, which the copy wrapper maps to -ENOENT.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T03:34:14Z","modified":"2026-11-04T04:59:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T07:00:56.720215Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12232","description":"The Intel ALH digital-audio-interface driver function dai_alh_get_properties() in drivers/dai/intel/alh/alh.c used a caller-supplied int stream_id with no range validation. The value indexes the fixed-size static const uint8_t alh_handshake_map[64] array and scales a FIFO register address, so an out-of-range stream_id produces an out-of-bounds read of one byte at an attacker-chosen signed offset from the array. That byte is written into prop-\u003edma_hs_id and the resulting struct dai_properties is copied back to the caller, leaking it.\n\ndai_get_properties_copy() is a Zephyr __syscall, and its verifier z_vrfy_dai_get_properties_copy() (drivers/dai/dai_handlers.c) validates only the device-object permission and the destination buffer, not stream_id. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to the ALH DAI device object can therefore call the syscall with an arbitrary stream_id, crossing the userspace/kernel sandbox boundary.\n\nThe impact is a one-byte-per-call arbitrary-offset kernel information disclosure (and leakage of a computed kernel address via fifo_address); a stream_id that resolves to an unmapped page faults in kernel context, giving a local denial of service. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE and device access, making this a local, moderate-severity issue. The fix rejects negative and too-large stream_id values up front and returns NULL, which the copy wrapper maps to -ENOENT.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T05:17:41.86Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:10:00.16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:36.880938Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12232","title":"Out-of-bounds read via unvalidated stream_id in Intel ALH DAI get_properties","description":"The Intel ALH digital-audio-interface driver function dai_alh_get_properties() in drivers/dai/intel/alh/alh.c used a caller-supplied int stream_id with no range validation. The value indexes the fixed-size static const uint8_t alh_handshake_map[64] array and scales a FIFO register address, so an out-of-range stream_id produces an out-of-bounds read of one byte at an attacker-chosen signed offset from the array. That byte is written into prop-\u003edma_hs_id and the resulting struct dai_properties is copied back to the caller, leaking it.\n\ndai_get_properties_copy() is a Zephyr __syscall, and its verifier z_vrfy_dai_get_properties_copy() (drivers/dai/dai_handlers.c) validates only the device-object permission and the destination buffer, not stream_id. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to the ALH DAI device object can therefore call the syscall with an arbitrary stream_id, crossing the userspace/kernel sandbox boundary.\n\nThe impact is a one-byte-per-call arbitrary-offset kernel information disclosure (and leakage of a computed kernel address via fifo_address); a stream_id that resolves to an unmapped page faults in kernel context, giving a local denial of service. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE and device access, making this a local, moderate-severity issue. The fix rejects negative and too-large stream_id values up front and returns NULL, which the copy wrapper maps to -ENOENT.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T03:34:14.145Z","modified":"2026-11-05T08:03:53.921184953Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T09:08:14.330889Z"}]}}