{"id":"CVE-2026-123769","aliases":["EUVD-2026-124972","GHSA-mwcq-x4pv-999x"],"status":"published","title":"SureDash \u003c= 1.13.0 - Authenticated (Custom+) Privilege Escalation to /suredash/v1/save-settings REST Endpoint","description":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-14","score":0.00427,"percentile":0.37521,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-11-13T09:35:11Z","modified":"2026-11-13T12:31:18Z","products":[{"vendor":"brainstormforce","product":"suredash – community, courses \u0026 member dashboard"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2f317dcd-dc4f-482a-8faa-91cd9c022276?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/sanitizer.php#L101"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/settings.php#L604"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/services/router.php#L108"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/backend.php#L1309"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/social-logins.php#L472"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3794229/suredash/trunk/core/routers/backend.php"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123769"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mwcq-x4pv-999x"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-123769","title":"SureDash \u003c= 1.13.0 - Authenticated (Custom+) Privilege Escalation to /suredash/v1/save-settings REST Endpoint","description":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-13T09:35:11.454Z","modified":"2026-11-13T09:35:11.454Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-13T10:27:12.184616Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-124972","description":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-13T09:35:11Z","modified":"2026-11-13T09:35:11Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-13T14:38:52.129855Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mwcq-x4pv-999x","title":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to...","description":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-13T12:31:13Z","modified":"2026-11-13T12:31:18Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-13T12:50:12.078093Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-123769","description":"The SureDash – Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-13T10:17:27.823Z","modified":"2026-11-13T10:17:27.953Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-13T11:35:38.52146Z"}]}}