{"id":"CVE-2026-12630","aliases":["EUVD-2026-60267","GHSA-45c8-pmgj-6jrc"],"status":"published","title":"6LoWPAN IPHC uncompression out-of-bounds read on reserved destination addressing mode","description":"Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc \u0026 NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.\n\nThe iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.\n\nThe out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003edata + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0026,"percentile":0.17918,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-125"],"published":"2026-08-17T16:18:51Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:03:11Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/1bbb7aefa69eaedc22281ce33aa7a2d5089d5a0e","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-45c8-pmgj-6jrc","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/12xxx/CVE-2026-12630.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12630","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12630","title":"6LoWPAN IPHC uncompression out-of-bounds read on reserved destination addressing mode","description":"Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc \u0026 NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.\n\nThe iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.\n\nThe out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003edata + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T16:18:51.419Z","modified":"2026-08-17T18:26:16.046Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:47.998488Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-60267","description":"Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc \u0026 NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.\n\nThe iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.\n\nThe out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003edata + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T16:18:51Z","modified":"2026-08-17T18:26:16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:48.395378Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12630","description":"Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc \u0026 NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.\n\nThe iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.\n\nThe out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003edata + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T17:16:39.13Z","modified":"2026-10-23T16:10:00.313Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:38.647684Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12630","title":"6LoWPAN IPHC uncompression out-of-bounds read on reserved destination addressing mode","description":"Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc \u0026 NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.\n\nThe iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.\n\nThe out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003edata + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T16:18:51.419Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:03:11.360585982Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:57.354194Z"}]}}