{"id":"CVE-2026-126537","aliases":["EUVD-2026-123410","GHSA-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj"],"status":"published","title":"Ninja Forms - File Uploads \u003c= 3.3.36 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via 'files[].data.file_path' Parameter via 'extra.saveProgress'","description":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-14","score":0.00928,"percentile":0.61088,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-11-11T12:34:45Z","modified":"2026-11-12T16:19:04Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"im0xfay/CVE-2026-126537","title":"im0xfay/CVE-2026-126537","date":"2026-11-12","url":"https://github.com/im0xfay/CVE-2026-126537"}],"products":[{"vendor":"saturdaydrive","product":"ninja forms - file uploads"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3670e2aa-6d8e-4ba5-ab65-49bd2a3dcacc?source=cve"},{"url":"https://ninjaforms.com/extensions/file-uploads/"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126537"},{"url":"https://ninjaforms.com/extensions/file-uploads"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-126537","title":"Ninja Forms - File Uploads \u003c= 3.3.36 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via 'files[].data.file_path' Parameter via 'extra.saveProgress'","description":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-11T12:34:45.417Z","modified":"2026-11-12T15:49:10.429Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T13:28:05.136075Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-123410","description":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-11T12:34:45Z","modified":"2026-11-12T15:49:10Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T17:29:40.367414Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rfc5-f6j6-9jgj","title":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and...","description":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-11T15:31:02Z","modified":"2026-11-11T15:31:08Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T15:34:48.112751Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-126537","description":"The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-11T13:17:23.81Z","modified":"2026-11-12T16:19:04.953Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-12T17:31:55.016259Z"}]}}