{"id":"CVE-2026-12905","aliases":["EUVD-2026-59850","GHSA-j9h8-cf5v-78mc"],"status":"published","title":"Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly \u003c= 27.7 - Authenticated (Staff+) Insecure Direct Object Reference to Sensitive Information Exposure via 'params[id]' Parameter","description":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-\u003estaff-\u003egetId() when $this-\u003erole === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00387,"percentile":0.33089,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-639"],"published":"2026-08-16T04:24:49Z","modified":"2026-08-20T12:48:10Z","products":[{"vendor":"ladela","product":"online scheduling and appointment booking system – bookly"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1600466e-ad45-4dc7-916b-6c97301d2b03?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php#L70"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php#L17"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php#L82"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php#L70"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php#L17"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php#L82"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool\u0026new=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12905"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j9h8-cf5v-78mc"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12905","title":"Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly \u003c= 27.7 - Authenticated (Staff+) Insecure Direct Object Reference to Sensitive Information Exposure via 'params[id]' Parameter","description":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-\u003estaff-\u003egetId() when $this-\u003erole === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-16T04:24:49.949Z","modified":"2026-08-17T16:06:16.276Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:48.461833Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-59850","description":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-\u003estaff-\u003egetId() when $this-\u003erole === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-16T04:24:49Z","modified":"2026-08-17T16:06:16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:48.853514Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-j9h8-cf5v-78mc","title":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up...","description":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-\u003estaff-\u003egetId() when $this-\u003erole === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-16T06:30:24Z","modified":"2026-08-16T06:30:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:31.619287Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-12905","description":"The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-\u003estaff-\u003egetId() when $this-\u003erole === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-16T05:16:45.947Z","modified":"2026-08-20T12:48:10.287Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:38.647684Z"}]}}