{"id":"CVE-2026-13318","aliases":["AZL-111575","AZL-91457","EUVD-2026-39595","GHSA-cgm6-wvp9-4g5h"],"status":"published","title":"Virt-api-rhel9: kubevirt: kubevirt: ssrf in virt-api port-forward via unvalidated guest-agent-reported ip","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00236,"percentile":0.14741,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-06-25T23:23:38Z","modified":"2026-11-04T17:30:04Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"kubevirt.io/kubevirt","fixed_in":["1.10.0-rc.0"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"kubevirt-openvmm","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.9.0-1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"kubevirt","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.8.4-4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"kubevirt.io/kubevirt","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.10.0-rc.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"kubevirt","product":"kubevirt"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat openshift virtualization 4"},{"vendor":"redhat","product":"openshift_virtualization"}],"references":[{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13318","tags":["vdb-entry","x_refsource_REDHAT","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492659","tags":["issue-tracking","x_refsource_REDHAT","Issue Tracking","Vendor Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13318","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cgm6-wvp9-4g5h"},{"url":"https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/pull/18753","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/0f5fef3309417f454565412f56f571f48358853f","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/df419a0f20aa7ddc9f4512431c3aed9a642ad1e1","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/releases/tag/v1.10.0-rc.0","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-13318","title":"Virt-api-rhel9: kubevirt: kubevirt: ssrf in virt-api port-forward via unvalidated guest-agent-reported ip","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T23:23:38.121Z","modified":"2026-06-26T12:35:31.627Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:50.24628Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-39595","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T23:23:38Z","modified":"2026-06-26T12:35:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:24.957062Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-cgm6-wvp9-4g5h","title":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler....","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-26T00:32:07Z","modified":"2026-06-26T00:32:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:08:59.978633Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-13318","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-26T00:16:51.277Z","modified":"2026-10-25T22:10:00.15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:26.045561Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-cgm6-wvp9-4g5h","title":"KubeVirt virt-api port-forward handler vulnerable to SSRF via guest-controlled VMI IP address","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-26T00:32:07Z","modified":"2026-11-04T17:30:04.834983641Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T17:42:00.555354Z"},{"id":"AZL-111575","title":"CVE-2026-13318 affecting package kubevirt-openvmm 1.9.0-1","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-26T00:16:51Z","modified":"2026-11-05T05:40:51Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:18.705965Z"},{"id":"AZL-91457","title":"CVE-2026-13318 affecting package kubevirt 1.8.4-4","description":"A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-26T00:16:51Z","modified":"2026-11-05T05:40:51Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:25.633663Z"}]}}