{"id":"CVE-2026-13481","aliases":["EUVD-2026-66557","GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"],"status":"published","title":"Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP","description":"The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00244,"percentile":0.15751,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-125"],"published":"2026-08-26T14:03:49Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:00:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/de98c3721a0e21ca269313997736f4f6193909ef","tags":["patch","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx","tags":["Exploit","Patch","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/13xxx/CVE-2026-13481.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13481","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-13481","title":"Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP","description":"The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-26T14:03:49.82Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:00:00.971Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T05:21:48.223566Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-66557","description":"The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-26T14:03:49Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:00:00Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T07:00:56.720215Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-13481","description":"The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-26T15:16:42.953Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:18:42.493Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T06:53:20.502063Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-13481","title":"Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP","description":"The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-26T14:03:49.82Z","modified":"2026-11-05T03:31:25.892362269Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T07:12:28.867005Z"}]}}