{"id":"CVE-2026-14495","aliases":["EUVD-2026-42167","GHSA-3585-g468-xfc2"],"status":"published","title":"DoLogin Security \u003c= 4.3 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness via 'dologin' Parameter Weak PRNG Token","description":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=\u003cid\u003e.\u003chash\u003e` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00767,"percentile":0.55842,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-338"],"published":"2026-07-08T05:34:07Z","modified":"2026-07-08T14:55:07Z","products":[{"vendor":"unknown","product":"dologin security"},{"vendor":"wpdo5ea","product":"dologin security"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/16bce371-b524-48eb-8537-3f9df802abd3?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php#L86"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/s.cls.php#L240"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php#L197"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php#L27"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14495"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3585-g468-xfc2"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-14495","title":"DoLogin Security \u003c= 4.3 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness via 'dologin' Parameter Weak PRNG Token","description":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=\u003cid\u003e.\u003chash\u003e` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-08T05:34:07.285Z","modified":"2026-07-08T12:44:30.272Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-338"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:32.13011Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-42167","description":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=\u003cid\u003e.\u003chash\u003e` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-08T05:34:07Z","modified":"2026-07-08T12:44:30Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:11.058935Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3585-g468-xfc2","title":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient...","description":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=\u003cid\u003e.\u003chash\u003e` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-08T06:31:36Z","modified":"2026-07-08T06:31:44Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-338"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:09:18.783285Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-14495","description":"The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=\u003cid\u003e.\u003chash\u003e` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-08T06:16:22.443Z","modified":"2026-07-08T14:55:07.843Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-338"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:28.040501Z"}]}}