{"id":"CVE-2026-17534","aliases":["EUVD-2026-49134","GHSA-28vq-345c-25gg"],"status":"published","title":"Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00158,"percentile":0.05037,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-07-27T09:19:23Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45Z","products":[{"vendor":"moonshotai","product":"kimi code"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code/commit/31449728b72df94e22bcb2de350a1e7624895e30","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code/pull/1791","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code/releases/tag/%40moonshot-ai%2Fkimi-code%400.27.0","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code","tags":["product","package"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17534","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-28vq-345c-25gg"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/17xxx/CVE-2026-17534.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"git://github.com/MoonshotAI/kimi-code","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-17534","title":"Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-27T09:19:23.982Z","modified":"2026-07-27T10:24:05.709Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:54.84674Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-49134","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-27T09:19:23Z","modified":"2026-07-27T10:24:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:38.034212Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-28vq-345c-25gg","title":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static...","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-27T12:31:16Z","modified":"2026-07-27T12:32:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:09:49.995101Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-17534","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-27T10:16:37.747Z","modified":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:32.830533Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-17534","title":"Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects","description":"Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-27T09:19:23.982Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45.400388867Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:58.024074Z"}]}}