{"id":"CVE-2026-18438","aliases":["EUVD-2026-59601","GHSA-wqqc-79qg-345q"],"status":"published","title":"Templately \u003c= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud Import Attachment Filename Mismatch","description":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.01312,"percentile":0.71057,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-434"],"published":"2026-08-15T09:25:18Z","modified":"2026-08-20T12:48:10Z","products":[{"vendor":"wpdevteam","product":"templately – elementor \u0026 gutenberg template library: 6500+ free \u0026 pro ready templates and cloud!"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4e68b2f2-12e4-4ff2-919d-26d6b21acd03?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/Import.php#L78"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/API.php#L128"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/Import.php#L78"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/API.php#L128"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3636643%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.2\u0026old=3624408%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.1"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3636643/templately/trunk/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.1\u0026new_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.2"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18438"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wqqc-79qg-345q"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-18438","title":"Templately \u003c= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud Import Attachment Filename Mismatch","description":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-15T09:25:18.17Z","modified":"2026-08-17T19:38:56.823Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-434"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:12.260247Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-59601","description":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-15T09:25:18Z","modified":"2026-08-17T19:38:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:48.395378Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-wqqc-79qg-345q","title":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And...","description":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-15T12:30:19Z","modified":"2026-08-15T12:30:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-434"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:30.897185Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-18438","description":"The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-15T10:16:29.413Z","modified":"2026-08-20T12:48:10.287Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-434"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:38.29747Z"}]}}