{"id":"CVE-2026-19991","aliases":["EUVD-2026-75939","GHSA-mw4c-2xg7-r9h8"],"status":"published","title":"UsersWP \u003c= 1.2.70 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Deletion","description":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..\u003cuploads-baseurl\u003e' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00652,"percentile":0.51703,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-09-11T03:39:39Z","modified":"2026-09-11T21:17:09Z","products":[{"vendor":"stiofansisland","product":"userswp – front-end login form, user registration, user profile \u0026 members directory plugin for wp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dfa094d3-e8db-4402-ad23-e161b1b6181e?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.70/includes/class-forms.php#L2432"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.70/includes/helpers/misc.php#L2107"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.70/includes/class-forms.php#L2420"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.70/includes/class-validation.php#L194"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.70/includes/class-forms.php#L2076"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3650759%40userswp%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3618724%40userswp%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19991"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mw4c-2xg7-r9h8"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-19991","title":"UsersWP \u003c= 1.2.70 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Deletion","description":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..\u003cuploads-baseurl\u003e' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-11T03:39:39.185Z","modified":"2026-09-11T20:30:39.441Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:47:17.512524Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-75939","description":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..\u003cuploads-baseurl\u003e' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-11T03:39:39Z","modified":"2026-09-11T20:30:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:21.886667Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mw4c-2xg7-r9h8","title":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and...","description":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..\u003cuploads-baseurl\u003e' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-11T06:31:13Z","modified":"2026-09-11T06:31:21Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:43.788148Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-19991","description":"The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..\u003cuploads-baseurl\u003e' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-11T04:17:34.99Z","modified":"2026-09-11T21:17:09.15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:46.271848Z"}]}}