{"id":"CVE-2026-22176","aliases":["EUVD-2026-13005","GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph"],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.19 - Command Injection via Unescaped Environment Variables in Windows Scheduled Task Script Generation","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like \u0026, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00677,"percentile":0.527,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-78"],"published":"2026-03-03T21:50:05Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:33Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.19"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2026.2.17"},{"fixed":"2026.2.19"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.19"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"openclaw","product":"openclaw"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph","tags":["vendor-advisory","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/dafe52e8cf1a041d898cfb304a485fa05e5f58fb","tags":["patch","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-command-injection-via-unescaped-environment-variables-in-windows-scheduled-task","tags":["third-party-advisory","Third Party Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22176","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/22xxx/CVE-2026-22176.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-22176","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.19 - Command Injection via Unescaped Environment Variables in Windows Scheduled Task Script Generation","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like \u0026, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-19T01:00:42.893Z","modified":"2026-06-23T16:13:49.077Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:39:16.730222Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-13005","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like \u0026, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-19T01:00:42Z","modified":"2026-06-23T16:13:49Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:32.768333Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph","title":"OpenClaw has a Command Injection via unescaped environment assignments in Windows Scheduled Task script generation","description":"### Summary\nA command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into `gateway.cmd` using unquoted `set KEY=VALUE`, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.17`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.2.19`\n- Latest published vulnerable version at review time (2026-02-19): `2026.2.17`\n\n### Practical Risk Context\nFor a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low.\n\nThis issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example:\n- shared/team config templates,\n- copied config snippets,\n- setup scripts, automation, or repos that write config,\n- any workflow where another party can influence env values before `gateway install`/reinstall.\n\nIn those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run.\n\n### Details\nOn Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (`schtasks`).\nBefore the fix, env lines were rendered as `set KEY=VALUE` in `src/daemon/schtasks.ts`, so values containing metacharacters (for example `\u0026`, `|`, `^`, `%`, `!`) could alter command behavior in `cmd.exe`.\n\nThe fix now renders quoted assignments (`set \"KEY=VALUE\"`) with explicit escaping for cmd metacharacters, updates parser compatibility for quoted assignments, and adds regression tests for metacharacter handling and round-trip parsing.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `dafe52e8cf1a041d898cfb304a485fa05e5f58fb`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-03T21:50:05Z","modified":"2026-03-20T21:35:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:40.633038Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-22176","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like \u0026, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-19T02:16:01.733Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:19:29.097Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:09.735529Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-22176","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.19 - Command Injection via Unescaped Environment Variables in Windows Scheduled Task Script Generation","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like \u0026, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-19T01:00:42.893Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:33.162451309Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:58.42038Z"},{"id":"GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph","title":"OpenClaw has a Command Injection via unescaped environment assignments in Windows Scheduled Task script generation","description":"### Summary\nA command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into `gateway.cmd` using unquoted `set KEY=VALUE`, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.17`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.2.19`\n- Latest published vulnerable version at review time (2026-02-19): `2026.2.17`\n\n### Practical Risk Context\nFor a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low.\n\nThis issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example:\n- shared/team config templates,\n- copied config snippets,\n- setup scripts, automation, or repos that write config,\n- any workflow where another party can influence env values before `gateway install`/reinstall.\n\nIn those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run.\n\n### Details\nOn Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (`schtasks`).\nBefore the fix, env lines were rendered as `set KEY=VALUE` in `src/daemon/schtasks.ts`, so values containing metacharacters (for example `\u0026`, `|`, `^`, `%`, `!`) could alter command behavior in `cmd.exe`.\n\nThe fix now renders quoted assignments (`set \"KEY=VALUE\"`) with explicit escaping for cmd metacharacters, updates parser compatibility for quoted assignments, and adds regression tests for metacharacter handling and round-trip parsing.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `dafe52e8cf1a041d898cfb304a485fa05e5f58fb`\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-03T21:50:05Z","modified":"2026-03-20T21:56:22.292813Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:53.244788Z"}]}}