{"id":"CVE-2026-27004","aliases":["EUVD-2026-8410","GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65"],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback","description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00118,"percentile":0.01716,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"published":"2026-02-18T22:43:53Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:51:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.15"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.15"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.15"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"openclaw","product":"openclaw"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27004","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27004.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27004","title":"OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback","description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-19T23:18:47.555Z","modified":"2026-02-20T15:37:31.097Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:48.826324Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-8410","description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-19T23:18:47Z","modified":"2026-02-20T15:37:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:37.056368Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65","title":"OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback","description":"## Vulnerability\n\nIn some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.\n\nIn Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.\n\n## Typical Use Case Context\n\nMost regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.\n- Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.\n- Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`.\n- Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.\n- Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c`\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-18T22:43:53Z","modified":"2026-02-20T16:47:20Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:26.881079Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27004","description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-20T00:16:17.14Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:26:31.407Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:06.63895Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27004","title":"OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback","description":"OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-19T23:18:47.555Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:51:07.019948684Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T03:25:28.514393Z"},{"id":"GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65","title":"OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback","description":"## Vulnerability\n\nIn some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.\n\nIn Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.\n\n## Typical Use Case Context\n\nMost regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.\n- Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.\n- Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`.\n- Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.\n- Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c`\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-18T22:43:53Z","modified":"2026-02-20T17:03:05.205745Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209","CWE-346"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:39.618611Z"}]}}