{"id":"CVE-2026-27803","aliases":["EUVD-2026-9503","GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27"],"status":"published","title":"Vaultwarden: Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","description":"Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00333,"percentile":0.26752,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-03-04T20:13:44Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:21Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"vaultwarden","fixed_in":["1.35.4"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"vaultwarden","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.35.3"},{"fixed":"1.35.4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"vaultwarden","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.35.4"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27803.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27803","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27803","title":"Vaultwarden: Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","description":"Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T21:40:33.495Z","modified":"2026-03-05T15:42:36.935Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863","CWE-285"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:48.461833Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-9503","description":"Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T21:40:33Z","modified":"2026-03-05T15:42:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:08.87511Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27","title":"Vaultwarden's Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","description":"## Summary\n\nTesting confirmed that even when a Manager has `manage=false` for a given collection, they can still perform the following management operations as long as they have access to the collection:\n\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e/users` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `DELETE /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n* The Manager guard checks only whether the user **can access the collection**, not whether they have `manage` privileges. This check is directly applied to management endpoints.\nsrc/auth.rs:816\n  ```rust\n\n  if !Collection::can_access_collection(\u0026headers.membership, \u0026col_id, \u0026conn).await {\n      err_handler!(\"The current user isn't a manager for this collection\")\n  }\n  ```\n\n* The `can_access_collection` function does **not** evaluate the `manage` flag.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:140\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn can_access_collection(member: \u0026Membership, col_id: \u0026CollectionId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)\n          \u0026\u0026 (member.has_full_access()\n              || CollectionUser::has_access_to_collection_by_user(col_id, \u0026member.user_uuid, conn).await\n              || ...\n  ```\n\n* A separate management-permission check exists and includes `manage` validation, but it is **not used** during authorization for the affected endpoints.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:516\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn is_manageable_by_user(\u0026self, user_uuid: \u0026UserId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(user_uuid, \u0026self.org_uuid, conn).await else {\n          return false;\n      };\n      if member.has_full_access() {\n          return true;\n      }\n      ...\n  ```\n\n* The actual update and deletion endpoints only accept `ManagerHeaders` and do not perform additional `manage` checks.\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:608\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_organization_collection_update(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:890\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_collection_users(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n  \n\nsrc/api/core/organizations.rs:747\n\n```rust\n  async fn delete_organization_collection(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n  ```\n\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker is a **Manager** within the target organization.\n* The attacker has access to the target collection (`assigned=true`).\n* The attacker’s permission for that collection is `manage=false`.\n* A valid API access token has been obtained.\n\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm that the attacker’s current permissions for the target collection include `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2015\" height=\"636\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/58ddc733-e37c-4766-a980-b1ea1918ceb4\" /\u003e\n\n2. As a control test, verify that update operations fail for collections the attacker cannot access.\n\u003cimg width=\"2021\" height=\"852\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8699442-2dfc-4d73-8940-ec10f4a175f0\" /\u003e\n\n3. Confirm that update operations succeed for the target collection where `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2013\" height=\"690\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33d9845d-d18e-456c-a58c-e780911347a9\" /\u003e\n\n4. Use `PUT /collections/{col_id}/users` to set `manage=true`, confirming that the attacker can escalate their own privileges.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"488\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/da8c5246-cf2a-46c2-9a25-e99d907f852d\" /\u003e\n\n5. Verify that deletion of the collection succeeds despite the Manager lacking management rights.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"487\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a97c8fb2-4f97-4c2a-a90b-9d95dbde84fd\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n## Required Minimum Privileges\n\n* Organization Manager role (Owner/Admin privileges are not required)\n* Works even with `access_all=false`\n* Only access rights to the target collection are required (`manage` privilege is not required)\n\n\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA restricted Manager (intended for read/use-only access) directly invokes the API to update collection settings, elevate their own privileges to `manage=true`, and even delete the collection.\n\nThis allows the user to bypass operational access restrictions and effectively gain administrator-equivalent control over the collection.\n\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Expansion of access scope through unauthorized privilege escalation and configuration changes.\n* **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection settings and assignments; potential disabling of access controls.\n* **Availability:** Deletion of collections may disrupt business operations.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T20:13:44Z","modified":"2026-03-04T20:13:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:31.060223Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27803","description":"Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T22:16:18.21Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:27:42.65Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:07.852448Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-27803","title":"Vaultwarden: Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","description":"Vaultwarden is an unofficial Bitwarden compatible server written in Rust, formerly known as bitwarden_rs. Prior to version 1.35.4, when a Manager has manage=false for a given collection, they can still perform several management operations as long as they have access to the collection. This issue has been patched in version 1.35.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T21:40:33.495Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:21.261854514Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:00.180685Z"},{"id":"GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27","title":"Vaultwarden's Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","description":"## Summary\n\nTesting confirmed that even when a Manager has `manage=false` for a given collection, they can still perform the following management operations as long as they have access to the collection:\n\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `PUT /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e/users` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `DELETE /api/organizations/\u003corg_id\u003e/collections/\u003ccol_id\u003e` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n* The Manager guard checks only whether the user **can access the collection**, not whether they have `manage` privileges. This check is directly applied to management endpoints.\nsrc/auth.rs:816\n  ```rust\n\n  if !Collection::can_access_collection(\u0026headers.membership, \u0026col_id, \u0026conn).await {\n      err_handler!(\"The current user isn't a manager for this collection\")\n  }\n  ```\n\n* The `can_access_collection` function does **not** evaluate the `manage` flag.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:140\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn can_access_collection(member: \u0026Membership, col_id: \u0026CollectionId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)\n          \u0026\u0026 (member.has_full_access()\n              || CollectionUser::has_access_to_collection_by_user(col_id, \u0026member.user_uuid, conn).await\n              || ...\n  ```\n\n* A separate management-permission check exists and includes `manage` validation, but it is **not used** during authorization for the affected endpoints.\n  src/db/models/collection.rs:516\n\n  ```rust\n\n  pub async fn is_manageable_by_user(\u0026self, user_uuid: \u0026UserId, conn: \u0026DbConn) -\u003e bool {\n      let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(user_uuid, \u0026self.org_uuid, conn).await else {\n          return false;\n      };\n      if member.has_full_access() {\n          return true;\n      }\n      ...\n  ```\n\n* The actual update and deletion endpoints only accept `ManagerHeaders` and do not perform additional `manage` checks.\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:608\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_organization_collection_update(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n\n  src/api/core/organizations.rs:890\n\n```rust\n  async fn put_collection_users(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n  \n\nsrc/api/core/organizations.rs:747\n\n```rust\n  async fn delete_organization_collection(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n  ```\n\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker is a **Manager** within the target organization.\n* The attacker has access to the target collection (`assigned=true`).\n* The attacker’s permission for that collection is `manage=false`.\n* A valid API access token has been obtained.\n\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm that the attacker’s current permissions for the target collection include `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2015\" height=\"636\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/58ddc733-e37c-4766-a980-b1ea1918ceb4\" /\u003e\n\n2. As a control test, verify that update operations fail for collections the attacker cannot access.\n\u003cimg width=\"2021\" height=\"852\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8699442-2dfc-4d73-8940-ec10f4a175f0\" /\u003e\n\n3. Confirm that update operations succeed for the target collection where `manage=false`.\n\u003cimg width=\"2013\" height=\"690\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33d9845d-d18e-456c-a58c-e780911347a9\" /\u003e\n\n4. Use `PUT /collections/{col_id}/users` to set `manage=true`, confirming that the attacker can escalate their own privileges.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"488\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/da8c5246-cf2a-46c2-9a25-e99d907f852d\" /\u003e\n\n5. Verify that deletion of the collection succeeds despite the Manager lacking management rights.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"487\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a97c8fb2-4f97-4c2a-a90b-9d95dbde84fd\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n## Required Minimum Privileges\n\n* Organization Manager role (Owner/Admin privileges are not required)\n* Works even with `access_all=false`\n* Only access rights to the target collection are required (`manage` privilege is not required)\n\n\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA restricted Manager (intended for read/use-only access) directly invokes the API to update collection settings, elevate their own privileges to `manage=true`, and even delete the collection.\n\nThis allows the user to bypass operational access restrictions and effectively gain administrator-equivalent control over the collection.\n\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Expansion of access scope through unauthorized privilege escalation and configuration changes.\n* **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection settings and assignments; potential disabling of access controls.\n* **Availability:** Deletion of collections may disrupt business operations.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-04T20:13:44Z","modified":"2026-03-04T20:41:20.105214Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:48.546324Z"}]}}