{"id":"CVE-2026-28446","aliases":["EUVD-2026-9896","GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.1 - Inbound Allowlist Policy Bypass in voice-call Extension via Empty Caller ID and Suffix Matching","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00747,"percentile":0.55151,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-287","CWE-303"],"published":"2026-02-17T21:36:34Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:08Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.2.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.2.2"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"openclaw","product":"openclaw"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x","tags":["vendor-advisory","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb","tags":["patch","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inbound-allowlist-policy-bypass-in-voice-call-extension-via-empty-caller-id","tags":["third-party-advisory","Third Party Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/28xxx/CVE-2026-28446.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-28446","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.1 - Inbound Allowlist Policy Bypass in voice-call Extension via Empty Caller ID and Suffix Matching","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-05T21:59:24.889Z","modified":"2026-03-11T13:41:17.757Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-303"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:02.290587Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-9896","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-05T21:59:24Z","modified":"2026-03-11T13:41:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:37.650533Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x","title":"OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)","description":"### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-17T21:36:34Z","modified":"2026-03-10T22:22:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:33.538417Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-28446","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-05T22:16:16.39Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:28:39.233Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-303"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:07.852448Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-28446","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.2.1 - Inbound Allowlist Policy Bypass in voice-call Extension via Empty Caller ID and Suffix Matching","description":"OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-05T21:59:24.889Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:08.477900841Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:00.530889Z"},{"id":"GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x","title":"OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)","description":"### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.","status":"published","published":"2026-02-17T21:36:34Z","modified":"2026-03-13T04:36:14.479579Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:37.528068Z"}]}}